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This thesis examines the nature and the scope of Soviet
relations with Iran with particular emphasis on the Iranian
Revolution of 1978-79 and the Iranian-Iraqi War which, as of
this writing is still in progress. The analysis focuses on
l) The importance of Iran to Soviet decision makers in
terms of the U.S.S.R. 's security, ideological, cultural
and economic goals in Southwest Asia; 2) The factors which
act to constrain Soviet foreign policy in Iran and the Persian
Gulf region and; 3) The strategic implications of Soviet
policy in Iran for the United States Navy and U.S. national
security. This analysis concludes that a superpower con-
frontation in Iran, although unlikely by design, is distinctly
possible due to the volatile nature of Iran and the problems
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"The problem of Russian capabilities and intentions,"
said a U.S. Government official in 19^5 1 "is so complex, and
the unknowns so numerous, that it is impossible to grasp the
situation fully and describe it in a set of coherent and well
established conclusions." The multifaceted problem of Soviet
intentions with respect to Iran is the focus of this assess-
ment. The Soviets have long been interested in cultivating
ties and gaining influence in the Persian Gulf region. The
problems that any outsider must deal with in this volatile
area have hindered Soviet efforts as well as Russian designs
for centuries. The current Islamic fundamentalist movement
in Iran presents one more obstacle to foreign policy planners
as well as a fresh opportunity for diplomats and decision
makers in the Soviet Union. The problem for the Kremlin is
a dilemma of choice among a broad menu of active and passive
diplomatic, economic, ideologic, and military courses avail-
able not only in Iran, but also, the Persian Gulf, Southwest
Asia and the world.
This assessment will address the following questions with
respect to Iran and the Iran-Iraq War: What are the foreign
policy options open to the Soviets? What are the factors that
condition the U.S.S.R.'s selection and implementation of a
policy line? What course of action are the Soviets presently

following, and what will the Kremlin's future strategy likely
entail? Finally, what are the strategic implications for the
United States Navy as it relates to U.S. foreign policy and
national security affairs? It is the contention of several
analysts that Iran is a keystone nation for both the Soviet
Union and the United States and may well "be the location for
a major superpower confrontation in the 1980' s. It is this
sobering scenario that enhances the assessment of Soviet
intentions in Iran, for, Soviet capabilities are known and
Russian willingness to confront the United States may be
growing
.
The analysis is presented in four sections. The first
segment will discuss the historical setting to place the actors
in their respective international relations positions and will
describe the broad framework of Soviet objectives in Southwest
Asia. Part two will focus on the U.S.S.R.'s attitude and
behavior during the Iranian revolution in 1978-79. The third
section will consider the Soviet response to the Iranian-Iraqi
War which, at the time of this analysis, continues unresolved.
The concluding segment will analyze Soviet foreign policy in






Russian history has "been significantly influenced by geog-
raphy. Characterized by its immense open spaces, steppes,
plains and inland seas, Russia has always been a land of con-
flict and conquest. The defense of this enormous Eurasian
landmass and the establishment of secure frontiers has been
the major goal of all who have ruled over this region, be
they Czars or Communists. The second most prevalent drive in
Russian history, expansionism, is a direct result of this
relentless pursuit for security. Territorial expansion, in
Richard Pipes' words was "the Russian way," just as it has
become the Soviet way. This outreach for security has con-
sistently been directed southward through the Middle East
towards the Indian Ocean. The eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries were punctuated by periodic Russian drives through
the Caucasus region into Southwest Asia which led to the
accumulation of territory in the vicinity of the Caspian Sea.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a large
measure of Russian energy was expended on competition with
the British in Persia in order to create a buffer zone to
assuage Russian insecurities.
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 did little to remove the
traditional Russian fear of insecurity, nor has it altered the
11

Russian tradition of southward expansion. The Soviets have
maintained a keen interest in the southern border regions as
well as in all contiguous states. On three occasions since
October 1917 > the Soviets have militarily occupied territories
in this southern region including: The 1919-21 Civil War
period when the Red Army pursued the counter-revolutionary
forces into Persia, the 19^1-^6 tripartite partitioning of
Iran in conjunction with Britain and the United States, and
the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. The purposes of these mil-
itary excursions were to provide security, stabilize the
southern regions, and oppose Western influence in the Middle
East. It is with this macro view of the Russian experience
in mind that we examine the evolving relationship of the
Soviets and their largest southern neighbor.
B. THE SOVIET UNION AND IRAN
The Soviet Union's approach toward Iran is quite different
from its approach to other Persian Gulf states. In terms of
the depths of interest, the duration of diplomatic links and
the importance attached to geography and stability on its
frontiers, Russian interest in Iran in one scholar's words is
^ ...
"profound and long-standing." Traditionally, Russian policies
toward Iran have been subject to fluctuation, ranging from
aggression and hostility to expressions of good will and aid
in support of Iranian development. The Persians have long
regarded the Soviet Union with distrust and fear. The primary
cause of this Iranian attitude has been the persistent Russian
12

southward expansionism. Iran lost territory to Russia on
three occasions in the nineteenth century following military
hostilities in Georgia which resulted in the treaty of Gulistan
in 181 3, in the Armenian region following the Treaty of Turko-
manchai in 1828, and in the areas east and west of the Caspian
Sea in 1873. Czarist Russia gained monetary, fishing, rail-
road and mineral concessions from the treaties that followed
these conflicts as well as preferential foreign trade status
at Iran's expense.
The twentieth century has been characterized by great
power maneuvering to gain influence and control in the Persian
Gulf region. In 1907, an Anglo-Russian agreement divided Iran
into British and Russian spheres of influence with a neutral
zone in-between. The Russian sphere embraced five Iranian
provinces adjacent to Russian including: Azerbaijan, Gilan,
Mazanderan, Gorgan and Khorasan. The Russian sphere also
included large areas in the central part of Iran as far south
as Isfahan. It thus included most of Iran's urban and cultural
centers as well as the most productive agricultural regions in
the north. During World War I the Russian and the British
armies, disregarding Iran's neutrality, operated freely
throughout Iran.
In spite of the denunciations of the Czarist imperialist
objectives by the newly created Bolshevik government in 1917.
Red Army units invaded Iran's Caspian region in 1920. The
Soviets gave a local rebel, Kuchik Khan, assistance in
13

establishing the Soviet Republic of Gilan, which was the first
n
experience in Soviet-sponsored communist rule in Asia. ' The
Gilan Republic was short-lived and collapsed in 1922 following
the Red Army's retreat from Iran. Moscow decided to abandon
the small-scale Gilan effort in an attempt to normalize its
relations with Iran as a whole.
In pursuit of this new enlarged policy perspective, Moscow
Q
concluded a Treaty of Friendship with Iran on February 26, 1921.
When it came to the actual implementation of this treaty, Russia's
southern neighbor soon discovered that the Kremlin was reluctant
to abandon the traditional objectives of Czarist imperialism.
One ominous remnant of the old Czarist expansionist tendencies
was reflected within the treaty, namely, article six which re-
served the right of the Soviet Union to send troops into Iranian
territory should the latter become a base for anti-Soviet aggres-
sion. The 1921 treaty was invoked as justification for a Soviet
invasion of Iran in 1941. Soviet leaders have subsequently
agreed that the 1921 treaty gave the U.S.S.R. the legal right
to send troops into Iran if there was any possible danger from
any outside source. Indeed, the Soviet-Iranian Friendship Treaty
has been brandished on numerous occasions during the Stalin,
Krushchev and Brezhnev eras including:
1. During the 1952 leadership crisis in Iran which the Soviets
announced support for Premier Mossadeq and nationalization of the
Iranian Oil Corporation. The Kremlin applauded Mossadeq' s efforts
as "anti-imperialist," while the renewal of U.S. military advisor-
ship of Iran's Armed Forces under the Shah in 1953 was "incompat-
ible with principles of good -neighborly relations" agreed upon in
the 1921 Treaty of Friendship. 9
14

2. In 1955 on conclusion of the Baghdad Pact in which Iran
joined Iraq and Turkey in forming a military alliance. The
formation of this pact prompted the Soviet Union to transmit
strong notes of protest in which Moscow charged that "the
accession of Iran to this military alignment is incompatible
with the interests of consolidating peace and security in the
region of the Middle and Near East and contradicts the good-
neighborly relations between Iran and the Soviet Union" and »
accused Iran of violating the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921.
3. Following the 1958 Iraqi coup, when Iran pressed the
United States for greater assurances of support in the Middle
East. In consonance with Pakistan and Turkey, Iran urged the
U.S. to formally join the Baghdad Pact, or as it came to be
known, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The result
was that the U.S. signed a bilateral defensive agreement with
Iran in March 1959. Throughout this period the Kremlin
attempted to forestall such an eventuality. Moscow attempted
to prevail upon Iran's Shah to sign a non-aggression pact with
the U.S.S.R. in place of a defensive agreement with the U.S.
as an extension of the 1921 Treaty. 11 On March 3, 1959. the
Iranian Foreign Minister announced that Iran was denouncing
Articles five and six of the Soviet-Iranian Friendship Treaty.
Moscow countered on 15 March with an article published in
Pravda asserting that the treaty remained fully operative
despite Iran's action. 12 it was not until 1978 when Iran was
in the throes of revolution that the 1921 treaty was called
upon again by the Russians.
Following the conclusion of the 1921 treaty, Iran's rela-
tions with the Soviet Union could be described as correct, but
not friendly. There were several incidents along the Iranian-
Soviet border during this period and Reza Shah had solid
grounds on which to suspect the involvement of Soviet author-
ities. At the same time, Reza Shah was determined to stamp
out indigenous communism and drove the Iranian Communist
1 3Party (Tudeh) underground which nettled Moscow. J In addition,
economic problems considerably dampened any spirit of cordiality
in Soviet-Iranian relations. Problems were manifested in argu-
ments over oil concessions, trade and fishing rights. Largely
to circumvent these problems, Reza Shah decided in 1931 "to move
15

towards the establishment of a trade monopoly with the new
leadership evolving in Germany.
At the outbreak of World War II, Germany accounted for
kl percent of the total foreign trade in Iran. After declar-
ing its neutrality in 1939 » the Iranian ruling elite increased
trade with Germany which was carried overland via Russia.
Russian-German cooperation reached its zenith in 19^0. A
secret protocol to the Four-Power Mutual Assistance Pact
between Germany, Italy, Japan and the U.S.S.R. stated that
"the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of
the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations
1 ^
of the Soviet Union." -' The German execution of operation
Barbarossa foiled those carefully charted plans and the Soviets
and British, citing the German threat to Southwest Asia, in-
vaded Iran in August 19^1. Iran was again divided into spheres
of influence and the Soviet Union obtained control of the same
five provinces cited in the 1907 Partition while Britain assumed
control over the remainder of the country. The capital, Teheran,
became a neutral enclave. Under Soviet and British pressure,
Reza Shah abdicated and departed Iran aboard a British vessel
for South Africa where he died in 19^.
The new pro -Ally cabinet that came to power in Iran conclu-
ded a Tripartite Treaty of Alliance on January 21, 19^2 with
Britain and the Soviet Union. The treaty stated that the
presence of Allied troops on Iranian soil was not a military
occupation; it gave the Allies transit and communications
16

facilities, reaffirmed Iranian independence, and provided for
withdrawal of the Allied troops within six months after the
1 f>
end of the war with the Axis.
Soon after the Japanese surrender was signed, serious
ant i -government dissidence "broke out in the Soviet-controlled
province of Azerbaijan. Attempts by the Iranian government
to control these disturbances were thwarted by the Russians
who used the occasion to broaden their hold in the northwest
and aided rebels in proclaiming the Autonomous Republic of
Azerbaijan on December 12, 19^5 • This action was followed by
the refusal of the Soviet Union to abide by the provisions of
the Tripartite Treaty and withdraw her troops. Finally, after
two months of United Nations negotiations involving the United
States, Britain, the Soviet Union and Iran, President Harry
Truman issued a nuclear ultimatum to Premier Stalin. The
Soviet troops were subsequently withdrawn from Iran in May
1 "7
1946. ' The price extracted for the Soviet withdrawal was a
joint economic agreement with the Iranians for the exploita-
tion of oil in the northwest provinces of Iran. The new Iran-
ian governing body (Majlis) however, refused to ratify the
Iranian-Soviet oil agreement on October 22, 19^7. and a new
cold war period of relations between Iran and the Soviet Union
was initiated.
Soviet-Iranian relations have passed through four distinct
phases since the Azerbaijan crisis ended in 19^7:
17

1. Soviet consolidation and the oil crisis, 1951-53
2. Campaigning against Iran's Western Alliance, 195^-62
3. Encouraging Iranian neutrality, 1963-77
k. The Revolutionary Period, 1978-81
The policies and tactics employed in each of these phases
have fluctuated, but the goal has "been unvarying: to deter
Iran from her Western Alliance, and to increase Soviet influ-
ence in the Persian Gulf. Soviet-Iranian relations overall
could be characterized as generally poor between 19^-7-1962.
During the Stalin years Soviet policies were crude and in-
volved an alternating mix of threats and cajoling. The one
period of improved Soviet-Iranian relations was during the
1951-53 oil nationalization struggle when the Mossadeq-led
Iranian government attempted to adopt a more neutralist inter-
national policy. The ousting of Mossadeq in August 1953 and
the restoration of the Pahlavi throne as a result of a suc-
cessful U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operation
ended this process and initiated the "special relationship"
1 8between Iran and the United States. After 1955* and the
conclusion of the Baghdad Pact, Iranian-Soviet relations were
particularly tense and a coordinated policy of "hostility and
19
obstructionism" was followed by the Soviets. Moscow subse-
quently pursued a three -pronged attack against Iran via
subversion, propaganda, and diplomacy to diminish the effect
of the Western Alliance.
18

It was not until 1962, when Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi
announced that no United States military bases or missile
sites would be permitted on Iranian territory, that Soviet
. . . . . . 20hostilities diminished. Once progress had been made in
clearly limiting Iran' s commitment towards military cooper-
ation with the West (CENTO), the Soviets inaugurated an "aid
and trade" offensive which was designed to indicate that the
U.S.S.R. was willing to overlook the political reversals of
the post-war period, to recognize the reality of the Shah's
power, and to offer technical, economic, and military assist-
21
ance to Iran. This era of ostensible good will proved to
be a watershed in Soviet-Iranian relations. The Soviet Union
no longer had to force its way into Iran, instead, it posed
as a friend to exploit soft spots or gaps opened by regional
developments or Western policies. Economic detente was pur-
sued on a bilateral basis between the Kremlin and Teheran.
In addition, Iran established closer economic relations with
the Warsaw Pact countries which were psychologically compli-
mentary to the new period of Soviet-Iranian cooperation.
During the period 1962-1978 • Soviet-Iranian economic,
military and political ties expanded greatly. The U.S.S.R.
promoted projects such as the massive Isfahan steel complex,
machine tool plants in Arak , a natural gas pipeline from Ahwaz
to the Soviet Union (IGAT-l), silos and other agricultural
facilities, and hydroelectric plants on the Aras and Atrek
22
rivers along the Soviet-Iranian border. In January 1967 a
19

significant milestone was reached when Teheran signed an
agreement with Moscow to purchase $110 million dollars worth
of Soviet military equipment thus making Iran the first Western
Alliance partner (CENTO) to purchase military equipment from
23
the U.S.S.R. During this period the government-to-government
and cultural relations advanced steadily marked by visits of




the return of a Soviet military defector in 1976.
From the Soviet perspective, this modification of relations
with Iran represented several distinct advantages:
1
.
It served to legitimize the Soviet Union as a trading
partner for Iranian development which has important spillover
effects into the Third World .
2. By asserting this partnership, Iran removed the self-
imposed barrier against the presence of technicians from
communist countries on its territory,
3. The trade relationships provided the Soviets with a new
opportunity to establish direct contacts with the Iranian
working classes, technocrats and military personnel.
k. It helped to legitimize the Tudeh as an acceptable,
albeit limited, political movement associated with a friendly
power.
5. It reduced Iranian dependence on the West. While eco-
nomic, military and technical assistance may not have been
equivalent to direct Soviet political influence in Iran, the
increase in Soviet presence provided the framework in which
political influence could grow.
G. SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHWEST ASIA
Nations do not have to embrace the ideology of communism
2Sto develop friendly relations with the Soviet Union. y One
can conclude from the behavior of the Brezhnev regime that
20

Marxist-Leninist doctrine is a somewhat diminished criterion
for establishing and maintaining contact with the States of
the Middle East, because Moscow has pursued and developed
cordial relations with a number of the governments in this
region where communism is not a viable ideology. Often, as
is the case in Iran and Iraq, Communist Party factions which
espouse the Kremlin brand of state organization are persecuted
and suppressed. Moscow's response in these instances is to
downplay the importance of ideology in favor of developing
state -to -state relations. This is not to say that communism
is irrelevant to the formation and conduct of Soviet policy,
but that ideology does not drive the decision process. Moscow
is certainly concerned with the preservation of a declared
Marxist government as evidenced by their continuing efforts
in Afghanistan. As the world communist ideological leaders,
the Soviets must follow this line to maintain their legitimacy
and preeminent position and to reduce their vulnerability to
attack by the People's Republic of China (PRC) based on Marx-
ist-Leninist ideological grounds.
Communism, and world socialist goals, are important to the
Kremlin because they provide inroads to the Third World and
maintain the struggle against capitalist imperialism on a
global scale. As opponents who voice alternative views,
communists offer a viable choice to many nations which fur-
thers the goals and interests of its declared leader. There-
fore, and particularly in the Middle East, communist parties
21

are relevant "but not overriding in their importance to Soviet
policy. In Iran for example, during the reign of the Shah,
it was deemed more important to further state-to-state relations
than to promote the Tudeh party. The same may be said of the
27Iraqi communist party as discussed in Chapter IV below. ' it
can be anticipated that Moscow will vigorously support, promote,
and defend communists in the Middle East only when the benefits
outweigh the costs in state -to -state relations. It is also
reasonable to conclude that in the absence of friendly state
relations that ideological goals, and support to local communist
movements, will be on the ascendency.
Economics has not played a central role in Soviet Middle
East policy to-date. Rather, economics has most often been
used as an instrument of foreign policy to further Soviet stra-
tegic and political aims. The Soviet economy is founded on
the principle of autarchy and has until recent years been over-
whelmingly inward-looking. In the Soviet centrally planned
economic model the planners have deemed it important to insu-
late the flow of U.S.S.R. products from external disruption.
This has led to a state -controlled monopoly on foreign business
and a high degree of bilateralism in trade. Trade is generally
conducted to obtain essential imports, is most often conducted
in a barter-like manner, and is tightly controlled to meet
OQ
exact quotas imposed by central planners. " All decisions are
made directly by the government, frequently without mediation




A review of economic relations with the Middle East leads
to the conclusion that military aid and economic aid are im-
portant ingredients in Soviet behavior while trade is of a
somewhat lesser important nature. One author whose study
covers the period of 195^-75 shows that the Middle East region
received over 70 percent of total Soviet aid and more than 75
percent of all Soviet military aid. Also, the Middle Eastern
countries accounted for more than half of Russia's trade with
the Third World. Of greater significance, the region's share
of the U.S.S.R. 's aid and trade has sharply increased over time
The share of total aid delivered to Southwest Asia rose from
less than half of Soviet expenditures during 1955-66 to about
85 percent during 197^-75. Militarily, the supplies delivered
to this region increased from 55 percent during the earlier
30decade to nearly 90 percent in recent years. The increases
are indicative of Soviet priorities in global relations and
demonstrate a specific trend of increasing interest in the
Middle East. (See Table 2-1 for current figures.)
A separate and distinctly important economic and political
objective of the Soviet Union is to exert positive influence
if not control over Middle Eastern oil. The fundamental impor-
tance of Middle Eastern oil in the world energy market is
sufficiently recognized. The growing weight of Soviet domestic
oil production and consumption patterns and the resultant in-
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debate.-^ The pattern that appears to emerge is one where
Soviet self-sufficiency in oil, their ability to supply the
Warsaw Pact nations, and generate the foreign exchange neces-
sary to purchase Western technology will decline in the near
32 . .
term.-' The proximity of abundant, relatively inexpensive
Middle Eastern supplies of oil makes importation an econom-
ically feasible aim and increases the importance of Iran in
Soviet policy planning.
The cultural aims of the Soviet Union are subordinate to
all other categories and relate closely to the political ob-
jectives outlined above. Specifically, the Soviet goal to
reduce and eliminate Western influence and replace it with
Soviet control, is supported by cultural programs. Russian
supercession is not an easy task. Western influence in South-
west Asia has been the overwhelming external influence for
nearly two hundred years. Beginning with the military control
and power exerted by European armies in the eighteenth century,
Western notions of economics, finance, trade and technology
have permeated the traditional structures of Muslim society. -^
The Soviets are viewed by traditionalists, both Arab and Persian,
as a member of these external forces and consequently, the Rus-
sians also suffer from the backlash and frustration exhibited
by nationalism in the region.
Moscow has not neglected the cultural front in Southwest
Asia. The Kremlin has initiated positive steps to increase
educational exchanges, to promote Soviet brotherhood through
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sports, art and music, and to visibly demonstrate the U.S.S.R.'s
scientific and technological achievements to the Third World.
These efforts have not produced a massive swing of Islamic
attitudes away from European and American culture towards
Soviet occidentalism. The Middle Eastern societies have a very
eclectic attitude towards outside forces in that they are anxious
to make use of all resources from East and West to increase in-
digenous development.
Recent events in Iran and Afghanistan have heightened the
awareness of Soviet decision makers to Islam. Kremlin leaders
are extremely sensitive to the possibility of ethnic and nation-
3<
alistic developments in their own non-Russian republics. ^ The
nearly fifty million Soviet Muslims in Central Asia and the rise
of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East provide additional
stimulus to Soviet cultural program development . There are many
overlapping cultural and ethnic ties between Soviet Muslims and
the people of Iran. These concerns lend added impetus and im-
portant emphasis to Soviet people -related programs inside the
U.S.S.R. and within the Middle East region. Finally, the demo-
graphic trends charted by the 1979 Soviet census indicate an
increasing population drift towards Central Asia. Current offi-
cial predictions are that, by the year 2000, the majority of
Soviet citizens will be Turkic-Muslims. One could conclude
from these factors that the emphasis on cultural unity and
identity between U.S.S.R. and Middle Eastern states and the




The security goals of Soviet policy in the Middle East
• . 37
are directly related to geopolitics. ' The strategic signif-
icance of Southwest Asia, its location, mineral resources and
proximity to Soviet borders makes this region an essential
ingredient in foreign policy planning. The historical quest
for stable borders has been described in ample detail elsewhere
Soviet paranoia and concern for security amidst a condition of
"capitalist encirclement" is another strong recurring theme in
several analysts' works. Also, the drive for southward expan-
sion towards warm-water ports is often described as a Soviet
principle ambition. Although the analytical rationale for
Russian behavior have varied, growing influence in Southwest
Asia is an accurate depiction of the status of the Soviet Union
today.
Security, the basic element of survival of the state, is
the original principle Soviet political objective in the Middle
East. A second primary goal not unrelated to the first, is
the reduction in physical presence and removal of Western in-
fluence in the region. The third objective is to expand the
Soviet position in Southwest Asia with the ultimate long-term
aim of controlling the region. " The Soviets have made several
important inroads in furthering their aims, but they continue
to strive toward a final achievement of regional political
objectives. The U.S.S.R. * s current position vis-a-vis the




One critical dimension of security in the Soviet Union is
the development and maintenance of superior Armed Forces. The
U.S.S.R.'s military goals in Southwest Asia are integrated with
their global military doctrine which is subordinate to the po-
litical policies of the state. This doctrine is described in
great detail in a variety of sources. For the purposes of
this analysis it is important to remember that Soviet military
power is a viable policy instrument that the leadership of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) can depend upon to
execute state policy without the limitations of public debate.
The Kremlin has built and deployed a truly global military
force which is capable of furthering the security goals in
Southwest Asia of deterring armed aggression against the Soviet
state and, if required, intervening in the region to stabilize
her borders.
In addition, there are several military objectives related
to Iran and the Persian Gulf region:
1. It is important to reduce overall Soviet vulnerability
to hostile military operations that could conceivably be con-
ducted from land and sea-based forces in Southwest Asia.
2. To deny contiguous waters as sanctuaries or havens for
hostile strategic weapons platforms including aircraft carrier
forces and ballistic missile submarines ,
3. To reduce and eliminate potentially hostile alliance
forces from being organized and operated in the region, es-
pecially those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
^. To develop contingency plans, capabilities and tactics to
intervene in a regional conflict, to maintain lines of friendly
communication and transportation, and to deny hostile external
forces the ability to exert military control over the region .
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5. To develop and. foster relationships with regional states
which would enable Soviet forces to operate effectively in this
region in times of crisis .
6. To promote Soviet military arms transfers and support
infrastructures for training, logistics and transportation in
support of state objectives .
7. Conduct visits, exchanges and demonstrations of Soviet
power through military presence .
A review of these major categories of Soviet objectives
in Southwest Asia emphasizes the superior position that polit-
ical objectives have in this region. In particular, the goals
of state security, reduction of Western presence and the pro-
motion of Soviet influence are stressed in the Middle East.
All other categories of aims are subordinate to the political
goals of the Soviet Union. It is for political reasons that
economic relations are promoted. Likewise, it is for reasons
of state security that military strategy and military planning
efforts are focused in the Middle East. Ideological and cul-
tural aims are driven by the political expediencies described
by Soviet decision makers. The Kremlin can be viewed as a
highly centralized policy organization that will exploit all
of their available resources to accomplish state political
goals. It is with these objectives in mind that we now turn
to recent developments in Iran.
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III. MOSCOW AND THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION
A. "purely AN internal affair"
The events of 1978-79 in Iran shocked the world. Cer-
tainly few, if any analysts in the United States or the
Soviet Union were willing to extrapolate the reformist move-
ment in Iran to the level of chaos and revolution that evolved
in the course of 1978. On the surface, the Shah seemed to "be
in a position of unshakeable control as the new year dawned.
Under his personal authority an army second to none in South-
west Asia was capably trained and equipped with the latest
U.S. technology. The Armed Forces were judged to be intensely
loyal to the state. Iran's economy was booming as oil revenues
reached unprecedented levels. The internal police, Savak, were
in positive control in the Iranian cities. Iran, the largest
and most powerful nation in the Gulf and a close ally of the
United States, was viewed by most observers as a "haven of
stability" in the ferment of the Middle East. On the inter-
national scene, the Shah had followed a policy of national
independence in the 1970 , s and had successfully achieved a
relative balance of power between the superpowers and Iran.
The Soviet Union was not in total agreement with all of the
Shah's policies. In the 1970' s the Iranian recognition of the
People's Republic of China, the backing of the Omanis against
the Dhofari insurgents and the support of Somalia against the
30

U.S.S.R. were particularly irksome to Soviet leaders. How-
ever, the Pahlavi regime was a known entity that provided a
measure of stability on the Soviet's southern border and was
rapidly becoming a valuable economic trading partner.
Under these conditions, the Soviets reacted to Iranian
events of 1978 with caution. The official Soviet press gen-
erally refrained from any commentary on the events inside
Iran. The standard reporting practice followed by the Soviet
news media was to periodically cite foreign newspaper accounts
regarding the events taking place in the Iranian cities and
oil fields. J The official Soviet governmental reaction was
to adopt a position of neutrality stating that the unrest in
Iran was purely an internal affair. To wit, Soviet Chairman
of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers Aleksei Kosygin sent a
routine telegram of congratulations to Jaafar Sharif-Emami the
new Iranian Prime Minister following his announced succession
to Dr. Jamshid Amuzegar in September 1978. The business-as-
usual approach towards Iran was highlighted by Soviet President
Brezhnev's greetings to the Shah on National Day in Iran Octo-
ber 30 » in which Brezhnev conveyed "congratulations and wishes
for progress and success on the occasion of the country's
national holiday." J
The first indication that Moscow's attitude towards the
Iranian situation was changing was a radio broadcast interview
with Izvestiia political commentator Alexsandr Bovin on 2 Oct-
ober, in which Bovin stated that the Iranian unrest was "caused
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by the growth in social inequality, the general corruption
of the government bureaucracy and the unrestrainable infla-
tion." The commentator went on to describe the extent of the
unrest, the demands of the opposition, and the absolute in-
volvement of the United States in support of the current
regime. Bovm's themes were later published in Lite raturnaya
Gazeta on 25 October, in which he vigorously denied any Soviet
involvement in Iran's struggle by stating: "the (Iranian)
government is busy telling the population that the events
taking place are the result of an 'anti-popular plot' on the
part of certain 'Marxists,' the result of outside interference
that is jeopardizing Iran's independence. Mechanically, they
brandish the 'threat of Communism.' However, few people believe
this." Bovin again cited the American interest and involvement
with the Shah's regime and concluded by predicting that "as long
as the causes remain the consequences will persist: an unstable
situation in the country, prone to explosions and upheavals."
B. A TURNING POINT IS REACHED
On November 5» 1978 Sharif-Emami agreed to resign as Iranian
Prime Minister after two and one -half disasterous months in
office during which time the opposition to the Shah began to
coalesce. Two days later, in a televised address to the nation,
the Shah appointed a defacto military government headed by Gen-
eral Gholamreza Azhari, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.
During his address, the Shah "pledged himself to correct the
•errors' of the past, to fight against corruption, redress
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injustices and restore civil liberties after the departure
of the military government." He ended by saying, "I know
everything about why you have given your lives." The pub-
lic confession by the Shah ended his credibility and strength-
ened the resolve of the demonstrators. The Soviets subsequently
broke their official silence on the events in Iran for the first
time. President Brezhnev in response to a question by a Pravda
correspondent regarding the possibility of Western interference
in the events of Iran replied:
"The Soviet Union, which maintains traditional, neighborly
relations with Iran, resolutely states that it is against
foreign interference in Iran's internal affairs by anyone,
in any form and under any pretext. The events taking
place there constitute a purely internal affair, and the
questions involved in them should be decided by the Iranians
themselves. All states should abide in this matter by the
principles in the U.N. Charter and a number of other basic
international documents, and should respect the sovereignty
and independence of Iran and its people
.
It must be clear also that any interference, especially
military, in the affairs of Iran—would be regarded by the
U.S.S.R. as a matter affecting its security interests. "^9
There were several factors in the Soviet debate which re-
sulted in this decisive shift in Moscow's policy. Certainly
the decision to become involved in the Iranian upheaval was
a result of careful consideration for ten months of the potential
risks and gains, the costs and the benefits in following such a
policy. Unfortunately, there is no Freedom of Information Act
in the Soviet Union which would enable one to follow the course
of the debates. However, some of the possible factors which
weighed on the minds of the decision makers are described below.
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1 . Soviet Potential Gains
The Brezhnev statement reported on 19 November was
designed to introduce ambiguity into the United States policy
planning and to enhance Soviet options in the Gulf crisis.
If the warning was successful in deterring a U.S. intervention,
a condition which was highly unlikely by this time , then Mos-
cow could and did use the statement at a later date to exploit
the Soviet role in defending the Revolution. In the meantime,
there were several potential gains to be registered if Moscow
successfully influenced the demise of the Shah and the rise of
a pro-Soviet or neutralist Iranian regime which would result in:
1. A tremendous setback for the United States in terms of
prestige and foreign policy. Iran, while enjoying the benefits
of the "special relationship" with the U.S., was one of the
strategic "two Pillars" of the Nixon doctrine for providing
peace and stability in the Persian Gulf. The Shah acted as a
U.S. proxy and gendarme in the region and was dedicated to en-
hancing Iran's modernization and strategic role in Southwest
Asia. The loss of Iran would cause other pro-Western nations
in the region to reconsider the political reliability of a
strong association with the Americans or, conversely, denying
the Soviet Union equal status in regional affairs.
2. A significant change in the balance of power in the
Middle East. A U.S. diminished role would most likely result
from a change in the Iranian government even if the new regime
were to be neutralist or pro -Western in their outlook.
3. An increase in the security of the U.S.S.R. 's border by
the lessening or removal of U.S. military presence. It was
possible to imagine a situation where the Iranian arms buildup
would be reduced or halted, and that part or all of the U.S.
logistics bases and intelligence installations would be dis-
mantled. The subsequent loss of U.S. presence would result in
a decline in Iranian military power and influence in the Gulf
region.
^. An increased opportunity for Soviet involvement and in-
fluence in Iran through security, military, economic and trade
associations. It would appear likely that a vacuum created by
3^

the United States' downgraded presence could be filled by a




In the event that the Shah were to survive the internal
threat that existed in November 1978, the Brezhnev regime could
point to the friendship, cooperation and obvious mutual interests
that were promoted by the November 19 warning message. However,
it was only after the wave of popular protest had grown to a
significant level and the U.S. had demonstrated a weak reaction
to the Iranian affair, that this policy line was adopted. There
were risks in publishing this statement which could lead to:
1. U.S. military or political intervention to actively restore
the Shah to his position of absolute power much as they did in
the 1953 Mossadeq coup. However, the Carter Administration'
s
cautious attitude and timid response to the Iranian crisis to-
date augured well for positive Soviet actions. 50
2. The undoing of economic links patiently developed over
two decades between Iran and the U.S.S.R. Those links included
the development of a substantial natural gas pipeline system
which was scheduled for enormous expansion. Soviet and Iranian
long-term plans for this pipeline system (IGAT-2) included the
eventual transfer of 1 . 65 billion cubic feet/day of Iranian
natural gas to the U.S.S.R. which would then reroute Soviet
natural gas to Eastern and Western Europe while collecting cash
payments for imputed transfer fees. 51
3. Potential problems in relations with other states and
their National Liberation regimes including Afghanistan, the
Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), Libya, and the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) who viewed the Shah's
activist Gulf policies with alarm and who might react negatively
to Soviet lack of active support for the peoples' movement in
Iran.
k. The cooling of relations with Iran might enhance develop-
ing Iranian-PRC relations. The Shah had established diplomatic
relations with Peking in 1971 in an effort to balance Soviet
presence in the Persian Gulf. The U.S.S.R. was very disturbed
by the growing Chinese involvement in Iran which was viewed as
a threat to Soviet interests. In 1978 Chinese leaders increased
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their diplomatic efforts in Iran which culminated with an
official state visit by PRC Chairman Hua Kuo-Feng in late
August. This visit was widely denounced in the Soviet press
as an attempt "by the Chinese to disrupt Soviet-Iranian rela-
tions as well as expand PRC "bilateral agreements with Iran
and other Middle Eastern states. -52
Events which followed the 19 November statement demon-
strated to the Soviets that a turning point had "been reached
in Iran. The gathering momentum of the public reaction to the
Shah's regime and the inability of the military government to
quell the uprising was registered in the Soviet press. For the
first time , denouncements of the Shah were printed in early
December as the Revolution was labelled "antimonarchist" and
"antifascist." The Soviets shifted their emphasis to active
support of the Revolution which was consequently called the
"Peoples' Uprising." Increasing Soviet emphasis and an intensi-
fied propaganda campaign were waged which aimed at placing the
responsibility for the Shah's errant behavior squarely on the
United States. In the words of one Soviet political observer:
"For ruling America there is no Iran as a country ... In gen-
eral, there is no Iran for the Iranians, but there is an Iran
for the Americans."-^
The dominant themes in Soviet radio and press reports
that emerged during November and December 1978 and which received
increasing emphasis in the weeks ahead included:
1
.
the legitimacy and growing virulence of the National
Front -led Peoples' Uprising in Iran;
2. the increasingly ant i -imperialist , anti-Zionist, anti-
Western nature of the revolt and the unity and cohesiveness of
all factions involved in the Revolution;
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3. the threat of the U.S. fomented reactionary forces and
the increasing likelihood of a military coup d'etat "by pro-
Shah forces;
k. the friendly, cooperative nature of the benevolent neigh'
"bor to the north.
C. CRISIS AND VICTORY
The Pahlavi Monarchy literally crumbled in the last days
of 1978. The Shah's military government failed to maintain
order or to wrest control of the cities from the demonstrators.
On 1 January 1979 the Azhari government collapsed. The Shah
cast about anxiously seeking to form a civilian government
that could save the monarchy and end the chaos in Iran. It
was during this time period that the Russian version of detente,
or the continuation of the "ideological struggle" was most
visible and vocal in Iran.
1 . The Soviet Propaganda Machinery and Its Products
The Soviets have been saying for several years to who-
ever would listen that, while detente required a certain amount
of East-West cooperation and the reduction of overall global
tensions that could threaten to escalate into a nuclear con-
frontation between the superpowers, the ideological struggle
would continue unabated. While American administrations
assumed that the ideological differences would be aired in
appropriate forums in a business-like fashion, the Kremlin
clearly had something else in mind. To the U.S.S.R. , ideolog-
ical struggle means the continuous waging of war by other means
and they have acted accordingly. In Iran, this struggle was
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intensified during the critical months of December 1978 and
January 1979 "by every means available to the Soviets including:
1. Persian-language radio broadcasts from Baku, known as
the National Voice of Iran (NVOI). For some seventeen years
this station broadcast, along with a second station that was
allied with the underground Tudeh party, daily unrestrained
attacks on the Shah and on "American imperialism." It has
been noted by one observer that "ever since the Shah's fall
appeared likely, the National Voice had doubled its broadcast
time ."55
2. Standard Moscow radio broadcasts in Persian, Arabic and
English. These broadcasts were used to keep the Iranian and
Gulf people aware of domestic and international events and
reactions to the Revolution. The Moscow-originated programs
included commentary, newscasts, round-table discussions,
answers to "listeners'" questions and official world reactions
to the Iranian situation. The crescendo of critical and in-
flammatory messages delivered during the crisis focused on the
threat of outside imperialist forces such as the CIA and Israeli
security service (Mossad) , and the U.S. "Gunboat Diplomacy"
represented by the Allied and American naval task force present
in the Gulf which was armed with "nuclear bombs. "56
3. Daily Soviet published news articles in newspapers, jour-
nals, magazines and the official Soviet news agency TASS in
English and Russian. These forums were used to communicate
every sort of horror, concern, threat and innuendo to the
broader global audience. The official printed media was used
to transmit loyal oppositionist statements from inside Iran
and around the globe in support of the now familiar themes of
the U.S. imperialist threat, Zionist involvement and the impend-
ing Chilean "Pinochet-style" military coup d'etat. Similarly,
the media was used to indoctrinate Soviet citizens regarding
the National Liberation movement in Iran and to maintain the
spectre of the American threat to the peace-loving peoples of
the Soviet Union and the world. When charged by the American
government with interference and incitement of the Iranian
Revolution, the Russian press responded that "in fact, the So-
viet press and radio are merely transmitting information on
the (Iranian) events, often drawn from American sources. "57
2. Covert Interferences
The range of Soviet clandestine involvement in the Iran-
ian Revolution has been widely discussed in the West. Soviet





Arms support and military training for guerrilla forces
conducted in consonance with the PLO . 58
2. Soviet infiltration of leftist organizations in Iran and
attempts to organize and operate communist cells in the Iranian
Armed Forces. 59
3. Soviet produced and distributed propaganda and revolu-
tionary materials, leaflets and pamphlets from various sources
including Moscow's Teheran embassy. °0
k. The Moscow funded, organized and sponsored Tudeh party
with its official newspaper Mardom and the promotion of the
Communist Party of Iran's (CPI) platforms and calls for unity
among all leftist forces in Iran.6l
The events of January and February 1979 are covered
62
extensively in various sources and will not be detailed here.
The Soviet response to this affair was to proclaim solidarity
with the Revolutionary Forces in Iran while continuing to hammer
at the incessant nature of the reactionary imperialist threat
presented by the United States. Moscow's motives are undoubt-
ably linked to her objectives in the region to reduce Western
influence, enhance the U.S.S.R. • s influence and to improve
Soviet security. The fall of the Shah and decline in American
I
presence which followed are important gains, but the volatile
; nature of Iran in the aftermath of Ayotollah Khomeini's return
|
is as much a constraint as it is an opportunity. For the Soviets,
the revolutionary process is still in-progress in Iran. The
,' ousting of the Shah, the creation of a provisional government
under Mehdi Bazargan, and the eventual declaration of the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran represented only the initial stages of
the enduring struggle for the creation of a truly democratic,
socialist, classless state based on the principles of Marxism-
Leninism. Accordingly, Moscow's policy towards Iran continues
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to encourage the development of their Revolution while attempt-
ing to strengthen the Soviet Union's political, economic, cul-
tural and military ties with Teheran. These endeavors have
proceeded in concert with a vigorous effort to undermine mod-
erate Iranian attitudes regarding the United States. The
Iranian leadership is constantly chided to maintain a vigorous
anti-U.S. public position to prevent the resumption of imper-
ialist influence in the region.
D. THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES
During the course of the Bazargan leadership in 1979 , and
throughout the Bani-Sadr presidency, the Soviets have continued
their ideological and physical support of the Iranian Revolution.
The Soviet press has maintained its call for vigilance against
the "conspiracy of elements that support the idea of a rightist
coup in Iran" under the leadership of the United States, espe-
cially during the period of the U.S. hostage crisis. J A second
theme that the Kremlin has pursued is to continuously call for
inclusion of the Tudeh party as a viable entity in the Revolution
by reminding the Iranian government of the "considerable impor-
tance" of the contributions of "other factions" in the 1978-79
6kRevolution. Thirdly, while generally praising the Ayotollah
Khomeini and the role of the clergy, Moscow has sought to remind
the Iranian people that: "despite its great influence, the
clergy is not the only opposition force in the country. The
traditional organizer of the anti-Shah, anti-American actions




of the Democratic Front." D Fourth, a recurring theme in
Soviet strategy is the building of solidarity and unity be-
tween Moscow and Teheran and offering to strengthen these ties.
The Soviet party line, stated repeatedly in all media, gener-
ally reflects this theme as demonstrated by the following
example
:
"The Soviet Union has invariably sympathized with the
Iranian people, their problems, difficulties, and worries,
and their fight for a brighter future. The U.S.S.R.
resolutely sided with the Iranian Revolution and did quite
a lot to prevent foreign intervention in Iranian affairs.
Naturally, it did not have the slightest intention of
interfering in them itself and now after the triumph of
the Iranian Revolution the Soviet Union is prepared to
help by all means to strengthen and extend good-neighborly
relations with Iran. "66
1 . The 1921 Treaty, A Useful Document
As stated above, the 1921 Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation has proven to be a valuable and timeless instrument
in Soviet and Iranian foreign relations. The November 1978
Brezhnev warning, although it did not specifically mention
that 1921 Treaty, was a clear reference to this international
legal document. In January, lest any doubt remain, Isvestiia
linked the Brezhnev statement and the Treaty and described the
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1921 document as "operative even now." ' Since that time,
Moscow has repeatedly sought to remind Iran that it considers
the Treaty a valid legal basis for Soviet-Iranian relations.
In February 1979. a Persian-language broadcast to Iran
stated that the Treaty
"... was the first equal rights treaty that Iran signed
with a big power based on Leninist principles of non-inter-
ference in affairs of others ... as you are aware, the

Soviet Union has consistently followed Lenin's policy of
good-neighborly relations and cooperation with Iran. The
Soviet-Iran Treaty signed in 1921 , the anniversary of which
is now occurring, is a clear example of this policy. "68
Similarly, an August 1979 newspaper report asserted that "arti-
cles five and six guaranteed the security and integrity of both
sides" and constituted a "serious warning to world reaction"
69
which has on several occasions encroached upon Iran.
Despite the fact that Iran's ruling Revolutionary
Council abrogated articles five and six of the 1921 Treaty in
January 1980 in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghan-
istan, a February Moscow broadcast in Persian declared that the
policy of "equality of rights, mutual respect for national sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in one
another's affairs, the principles of peace, cooperation and
good-neighborliness
. . . set during the first years of Soviet
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rule, is manifested in the 1921 Soviet-Iranian agreement."'
It can be of little comfort to the present Iranian
government that the Kremlin resurfaced the 1921 Treaty under
the pretext of defending Iran's independence. Nor can the
Iranians afford to ignore the fact that Soviet coverage of
developments in Iran has increasingly sought to depict a situ-
ation comparable to the one purported to have prompted Soviet
"fraternal assistance" to Afghanistan. That is, one in which
a revolutionary regime on the border of the Soviet Union is
71being threatened by outside forces led by the United States.
^2

2. Iranian-Soviet Post-Revolutionary Relations
Iranian reaction to Moscow's foreign policy strategy
has been mixed, at best. Under Khomeini's watchful eye, Iran
has pursued a policy of non-alignment which includes a willing-
ness to expand trade with the Russians, while criticizing them
72for their December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet
Union has responded by maintaining a significant degree of
flexibility in their relationship with Iran. Moscow has alter-
Inately praised and condemned various Iranian positions, factions
and leaders. The Kremlin has consistently used the "carrot and
stick" approach with Teheran raising issues for cooperation
such as the utilization of Soviet trade routes to thwart the
U.S. sponsored economic blockade which followed the 1979 taking
of U.S. embassy personnel as hostages, calls for increased eco-
nomic cooperation, and offers of miltary assistance. Alterna-
tively, Soviet threats have been issued covering topics as
varied as Moscow's willingness to provide assistance to Iranian
ethnic minorities, the possible reprisals against Afghan counter-
revolutionary sanctuaries inside Iran, and the Soviet intent,
if necessary, to provide military protection and security for
73Russian diplomatic personnel and property in Iran.'^
Soviet-Iranian relations were particularly tense follow-
ing the 27 December 1980 attack on Moscow's embassy in Teheran
in which thousands of Iranian protesters marched on the embassy
to mark the one year anniversary of the Soviet invasion of
neighboring Afghanistan. During the march, the embassy compound
^3

was overrun by demonstrators who damaged property, threatened
employees, and burned the Russian flag. Soviet protest notes
to Iranian officials vehemently denounced the "piratic attack"
and the "failure of the government" to take effective and
timely measures to protect the extra-territoriality of the
Soviet embassy. Ultimately, the Iranian ambassador was sum-
moned to the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs where a formal
protest was lodged. In conclusion, the protest emphasized that
"The Soviet Union, as before, is ready to build its relations
with Iran on the basis of good-neighborliness and mutual re-
spect. At the same time no one should have any doubt that it
will have to protect the legitimate rights and interests of
the Soviet state and its citizens if the Iranian Government
does not wish or finds itself unable to perform its duty re-
garding the ensurance of the safety of the Soviet institutions
and their personnel in Iran. 75
The Iranian government did not respond officially to this note
and the incident has passed.
Although the monarchy has been removed and significant
benefits derived, the evolution of the Soviet-Iranian association
was, and remains incomplete. The Soviet Union continues to work
for changes in Iranian behavior that will enhance Moscow's long
range strategic goals. It was with the Southwest Asian objectives
in mind, that the U.S.S.R. was striving towards in 1980 when a
Soviet ally invaded Iran in a bid to topple and remove the source
of Sh'ite agitation in the Gulf. The Iraqi invasion created a
potentially serious dilemma for Soviet leaders who were faced
with the prospect of having to choose sides or stay out of a con-
flict on their southern border over which they exercised little
control. If it were to become necessary to support one of the
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combatants, which side will best serve Soviet aims in the
region? The Soviet problem of net assessment in this




IV, THE IRAN -IRAQ WAR
A. SOVIET-IRAQI RELATIONS
The 1958 overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq
marked the turning point of Soviet policy toward the Arab
Middle East. From 1958 to the present, the Kremlin has
pursued positive regional goals directed towards the growth
of Soviet influence in Southwest Asia, as opposed to the
basic defensive posture assumed during the previous Cold War
period. Although erratic, the Soviet Union has pursued a
general policy of friendship toward Iraq which has continued
for over two decades. The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP),
founded in 193^» first cooperated with Abdel Karim Qasim,
the army officer who led the 1958 coup which overthrew the
Royal Government, and subsequently colluded with the Baath
party which came to power in 1968.
During the period 1968-1973 Iraqi-Soviet relations reached
a zenith and the ICP came as near as it has ever come to sharing
power with the Baathists. Then President Hasan al-Bakr visited
the U.S.S.R. in September 1972 and concluded a fifteen-year
Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship. In 1973. at the prodding
of the Soviets, the ICP and Baath formed a National Front along
with the main Kurdish ethnic party, which agreed to divide the
ruling authority of the country and guaranteed all parties
acceptance and participation in the central government. This
kG

coalition weathered the ensuing ups and downs of Soviet-Iraqi
relations during the turbulent period 1973-1978.
The Kremlin followed a very delicate policy line during
77these years of balancing relations among all Arab nations. '
For example, in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War,
the Soviets supported Egypt and Syria in their efforts to
reach a negotiated settlement with Israel. Iraq opposed this
settlement and organized a "Rejection Front" which included
the Palestine Liberation Organization, Libya and Jordan.
Next, in 1975. the U.S.S.R. declined to support Iraq in its
ongoing dispute with Iran over the Shatt al-Arab international
water boundary and disagreed with Baghdad on how best to solve
the Iranian-supported Kurdish conflict. When the Algerian-
mediated Iranian-Iraqi Treaty concerning these two issues
was signed in March 1975. the Soviets reproached the Iraqis
for acting without consulting the U.S.S.R. under the terms of
the 1972 Treaty. 78
Despite these differences, Soviet-Iraqi military relations
grew stronger in the period 1973-1978. Military leaders of
the two countries exchanged visits and Soviet naval units
first visited the Iraqi port of Urn Qasr. Soviet military aid
continued to grow as did Iraq's prestige and importance. Sub-
sequent to Egyptian President Sadat's "traitorous" visit to
Jerusalem in November 1977. Soviet arms flows increased to
Baghdad and included Mig-23 fighters, TU-22 bombers, IL-76
transport planes and sophisticated missiles. (See Table k-1
^7

for a comparison of arms transfers conducted in Iraq and Iran
for the period 197^-78.)
A serious breakdown in Soviet-Iraqi relations, which led
to the demise of the ICP-Baath coalition, occurred as a result
of events which developed beginning in 1978. The first sign
of impending difficulties was the Iraqi request to the Soviet
embassy in Baghdad to relocate. This embassy was near enough
to the Iraqi presidential palace to electronically eavesdrop
on discussions in the palace. When the Soviets refused to
move, the Iraqis cut electricity and water to the embassy
until the Soviets complied with the request. In May 1978,
twenty-one Iraqi soldiers were executed for allegedly attempt-
ing to organize communist cells in the Armed Forces. Those
executed were subject to the provisions of an Iraqi law which
forbids non-Baathist political activities within the Armed
Forces. In July 1978 this same law was extended retroactively
to all those who had left the army since 1968. Additionally,
the Iraqi government conducted a sweeping campaign outside the
Armed Forces against ICP sympathizers. There have reportedly
been more than 20,000 arrests in the past few years. Moreover,
there have been neither trials nor sentences, and according to
Amnesty International, those arrested have been tortured— some
79
to the point of death. y
Another irritant in Soviet-Iraqi relations was the Iraqi
aid to the Eritrean Nationalists fighting the Soviet-backed
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reported in the Kuwaiti newspaper A 1-Siyassa - -without being
contradicted by Iraq--that then Vice President Saddam Hussain
had threatened to break off diplomatic relations with Moscow
Qq
if the Soviets persisted in providing massive aid to Ethiopia.
Baghdad had denied the Soviet airlift to Ethiopia, refueling
or staging rights in Iraq. In a July 9 interview in Newsweek .
Hussain stated that "The Soviet Union will not be satisfied
until the whole world becomes communist."
The Soviets remained calm throughout this troubled period
and stressed the importance of Soviet-Iraqi mutual relations
rather than differences. Saddam Hussain traveled to Moscow
in December 1978 and signed two new agreements on economic
cooperation. In a joint communique issued December 12, 1978,
the two governments condemned the Camp David peace process
and called for "unity of all forces in the Arab world opposed
to the policy of capitulation" and hinted at increased mili-
Q-J
tary cooperation between the states.
Moscow's goal in recent years appears to be to retain
influence in Iraq without making any serious new commitments.
Although Iraq remains a Soviet ally, the prospects for Moscow's
influence in Iraq may be viewed as diminishing. Following the
1979 Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, Iraq joined other Arab
states in roundly condemning the Soviet involvement in an
p o
Islamic sovereign state. Iraqi persecution of the ICP has
continued and the party newspaper has been suppressed. D The
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Soviets have been unable to do little more than broadcast
support for the ICP's pleas for unity and cooperation among
Iraqi forces and to call for an end to the persecution of
communists in Iraq.
Nowhere has this declining relationship become more
evident than in the areas of economic trade and military
sales. As a result of a 1980 Soviet-Iraqi trade protocol,
Soviet imports of Iraqi products during the first six months
of the calendar year increased to 177 million rubles compared
with 122 million during the same period in 1979. However,
Iraq's imports from the Soviet Union during the January-June
portion of 1980 declined drastically to 315 million rubles
compared to a ^6$ million trade volume for the first half of
1979. Equally illuminating, is Iraq's efforts to diversify
their foreign military sources of supply. The U.S.S.R., in
one analyst's words, "has ceased to be Iraq's sole supplier
of military equipment," in fact, "The Soviet share of Iraq's
military imports fell from 95 percent in 1972 to 63 percent
in 1979." This decline in Soviet prestige and influence
in Iraq is an important variable that must be factored into
an assessment of the Soviet strategic planning in terms of
the present Gulf conflict.
B. COUNTRY COMPARISON
Soviet decision making is influenced by a multitude of
factors. The initial step in determining the selection of a
policy in the Iranian-Iraqi conflict is to compare these two
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nations in several categories to determine the current and
potential value of each nation to the Soviet Union. What
is the military strength of the belligerents? What is their
economic potential? Are they geo-strategically significant
to Soviet short-term, mi d-range , or long-term goals? These
questions suggest the type of information necessary to com-
pile in order to perform a net assessment for input to policy-
level planners. The factors that will he reviewed in this
assessment include: geography, population, economics, oil
and national security. The data compiled for this analysis
are listed in Appendix A, "A Country Comparison," and Appen-
dix B, "The Military Order of Battle."
The geo -strategic location of Iran would make it the over-
whelming favorite among Soviet military planners. Iran has
approximately 1250 miles of border with the U.S.S.R. and an
additional ^00 miles with the Soviet-sponsored government in
Afghanistan. It is a riparian state with borders on both the
Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf and sits astride the Straits
or Hormuz. With its nearly 2000 miles of sea coast and seven
major ports, Iran is ideally suited to provide support for
naval and marine activity. The Persian land mass is nearly
four times as large as Iraq and offers three times as much
agricultural land. Iraq is virtually a land-locked country
whose nearest border to the Soviet Union is 150 miles across
Iranian or Turkish airspace.
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Population as a variable is difficult to assess. How-
ever, in terms of sheer numbers, Iran's population of 37.5
million is nearly three times the size of Iraq, a country
of 13 million people. There are numerous ethnic groups in
each country with several major languages, cultures and
religions represented. In terms of religion, both nations
are overwhelmingly Islamic with Shi 'a Muslims numerically
superior in both states. Iran is primarily a Persian nation
while Iraq is an Arab state. Both nations are populated by
large working and peasant classes, moderate middle classes,
and a very small elite structure
.
Economically speaking, Iran and Iraq can be categorized
as developing countries using their oil industries to finance
development. Their respective industrial bases, prior to
the war were small, but growing. Agriculture typically
employs one half of the labor force and both nations are
dependent upon food imports. Soviet economic aid figures for
Iran and Iraq are shown in Table 4-2, and selected Soviet trade
figures are cited in Table 4-3. In terms of investment, Moscow
has provided more aid to Iran in the twenty year period cited
than it has to Iraq. Additionally, since the Western economic
sanctions were imposed against Iran in the wake of the U.S.
hostage affair, Soviet exports to Iran have reportedly increased
from 65 million rubles during the itme period January-June 1979
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these figures are relatively small when compared to the global
Soviet aid and trade effort. Certainly neither nation can be
considered a possible major trading partner in the near or
long-term.
Prior to the Revolution, Iran was a substantial oil,
natural gas and refined products producer. The demonstrated
peak production (6.2 million barrels per day) and substantial
proven reserves of oil would make Iran a valuable ally. When
one adds the large natural gas capability (^,520 million cubic
feet per day) and known reserves (377 trillion cubic feet) Iran's
value increases significantly. The late Shah's economic pro-
grams were designed to get Iran into all phases of the petroleum
market which included building a large refinery capacity
(800,000 barrels per day in 1977). a fleet of tankers to deliver
crude and refined products to consumer markets, an elaborate
pipeline system for regional deliveries, and procuring a Navy
capable of protecting these Iranian assets while controlling
the vital Straits of Hormuz.
On the eve of the war, Iran's production of oil had dwindled
to only 1.2 MBD, of which 700,000 barrels/day were used for
87
domestic consumption and only 500.000 barrels/day were exported.
Furthermore, after the Revolution, the delivery of natural gas
to the Soviet Union dropped from nearly 1.0 billion cubic feet
per day to 0.^ billion. By early 1980, gas deliveries had
declined further to 150 million CFD or 15 percent of the vol-
ume established in a 1970 trade contract. In late 1979 i Iran
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demanded a renegotiation of the fifteen year contract seeking:
1. a fivefold increase in price from $ .75 per thousand
cubic feet to $3.63;
2. the contracted volume be reduced to 0.25 billion CFD;
3. payments be made in hard currencies.
The Russians agreed in March 1980 to increase prices to $2.50
per thousand cubic feet and to reduce the contracted delivery
amounts to 0.25 billion CFD, however, the hard currency issue
has not been resolved. Eventually, a flood and landslide cut
off all deliveries to the U.S.S.R. in March 1980 and Iran is
not making any effort to resume deliveries until the price
, . 88issue is resolved.
Since the outbreak of the war, both Iraq and Iran have been
able to bomb and shell each other's oil facilities almost at
will. Neither side appears able to defend these oil instal-
lations and there has been substantial damage to pipelines,
maritime loading terminals, refineries, pumps, and storage
tanks. If one assumes that the war will not result in great
structural damage to the oil fields themselves, normal production
capacity should be resumed in Iraq in three to twelve months
depending on the degree of damage to Iraqi production and trans-
89port facilities. In Iran, damage from the war has been com-
pounded by mismanagement and the Revolution which makes it
difficult to predict when and if Iran will be able to restore
its pre-war and pre -Revolutionary production capacity.
One author has described the Iran-Iraq War as a study in
the "futility of arms."' Both sides have proven their
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inabilibty to defend oil facilities, protect their civilian
populations, or achieve a military solution to this conflict.
The war has become in John Campbell's words "a phony war, a
page thirteen war" in which neither side is able to achieve
91
victory. Six months after the September 22, 1980 initiation
of full-scale hostilities by Iraq, there is no end in sight
and the costs of the conflict continue to climb. The war
may leave Iran and Iraq without an offensive military capabil-
ity or effective defense forces. For all of their arms expendi
tures, neither side has been able to affect the course of the
war or cause political change in the opposing nation.
From a military perspective, the performance of Iraq has
been dismal in the air, ineffective on the ground, and in-
visible at sea. Despite the massive expenditures on arms, and
military aid received from the Soviet Union, Saddam Hussain's
boast that Iraq would settle the issue of military supremacy
in the Gulf "for the next fifty years," is an unfulfilled
92fantasy. Iran's actions, although not impressive in light
of their large investments in equipment and training during
the past decade, have surprised many analysts and shocked Iraq.
Following two years of internal chaos and the dissolution of
external supply support, Iran has demonstrated sufficient
defensive capability to frustrate Iraq's military plans.
Appendix B lists the military order of battle for the two
belligerents at the outbreak of hostilities. Despite Iran's
seeming numerical superiority, the sides are well -matched.
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Iraq has enjoyed several advantages in this conflict including
the element of surprise, a lengthly planning period, and well-
equipped and maintained forces with which to prosecute the
war. Their lines of supply and communication are shorter,
and Iraq's transportation system was in good working order.
Despite these advantages and an 80,000-man ground attack force
trained and equipped with Soviet arms, Iraq has been unable to
control the tempo of the war and achieve an early military
93
victory. 7J
For Iraq, regardless of the outcome of the fighting, the
future may be bleak. Any peace settlement which involves
Iraqi withdrawal from occupied territories might prove the end
of the Hussam government. Even limited victory in Khuzestan
province may mean eventual defeat because of the vulnerability
of Iraq to Iranian air attack, political agitation of ethnic
forces in the river plateau area, and protracted guerrilla
warfare with the revengeful Iranians. Total victory and the
replacement of the Khomeini regime with a moderate government
which would cooperate with Iraq is an unlikely prospect. Most
likely, Saddam Hussain' s attempt to gain "fifty years of mil-
itary supremacy" in the Persian Gulf will end with fifty more
years of hatred and instability and could spell personal dis-
9^
aster for the Iraqi leader.
Iran has been characterized as "the sick man of the Gulf,"
yet the war with Iraq has demonstrated that it is premature to
96discount Iran as a military and political force in the region.
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At the outset of the war, Iran had only one armored division
in the Khuzestan area to face the 80,000-man Iraqi force. '
Iran's military hierarchy had been decimated by revolutionary
purges, their military forces were in a state of disrepair,
and the reliability of its remaining manpower and equipment
was questionable. Despite these shortcomings, the Iranian
air and ground forces have managed to frustrate Iraqi war
objectives, attack military and economic targets in the in-
vader's homeland, and bring the war to its present stalemate
on all fronts. Meanwhile, the Iranian Navy has faced only
limited opposition and has played an almost insignificant
role in the fighting.
98The results of the war have been devastating for Iran.
Although the political factions have coalesced to oppose the
invaders, the truce between internal factions may be temporary.
The economic system is devastated, the oil system is virtually
destroyed, energy supplies are dwindling, food is scarce, and
the national debt is enormous. Iran has been isolated in the
region as a result of its revolutionary fervor and willingness
to export instability. Internationally, Iran is in need of
allies who can provide economic and military aid in order to
sustain the present war efforts and to help rebuild the nation.
The prospects for Iranian military victory are bleak; a prolonged
stalemate or defeat is more likely. In either circumstance the
collapse of the fundamentalist government will probably ensue




C. LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
In an attempt to review the Soviet foreign policy decision
process as it applies to the Iranian-Iraqi War, it is important
to consider the costs and risks of policy implementation applied
to several levels of analysis. There are three levels that will
he addressed in this study. The first level is that of the
nation-state. From the perspective of internal forces, what
elements are to be considered in Soviet policy selection? What
are the domestic constraints that apply to foreign policy? The
second level for review is the region. How are local actors
viewed in the Soviet decision process? What are the pluses
and minuses in pursuing a policy line at this level? Finally,
at the global level of analysis, what is the overall effect of
a Soviet response to the Iran-Iraq War on the international
system? How does this level compare in importance to the
region and nation levels? The levels of analysis approach
applied to the policy selection question is a basic step towards
comprehending current Soviet policy regarding Iran and Iraq.
1 . The Nation-State Level
In previous sections we have discussed two prominent
ingredients in the Soviet policy recipe, namely, Moscow's
objectives in the Middle East and the power inventory of Iran
and Iraq. What remains to be described at this level are the
domestic constraints that affect Soviet decision making. These
constraints can be viewed in the same framework as the overall-
objectives discussion which centers on politics, economics, ideol-
ogy i culture and the military.
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In the economic realm, the Soviet Union is presently
engaged in a delicate balancing act in the Iranian-Iraqi War.
They appear to be performing the inevitable calculations of
potential gains and losses while attempting to maintain some
measure of control in the region. The U.S.S.R. has found
itself in a situation where anything it might say or do about
the conflict would be regarded by the Iranians and the Iraqis
as taking sides. Increases in aid with treaty-partner- and
some times -ally-Iraq would threaten Iran who would perceive
such aid as Soviet assistance designed to kill Iranian citizens
and subdivide the Iranian nation. Bilateral relations with
Iraq will suffer however, if no aid is forthcoming. Moreover,
Moscow would then be open to charges that they do not honor
their treaty commitments. A small-scale aid program to Iraq
would force Iraqi President Hussain to look elsewhere for sup-
QQ
port, which he is already doing. 7 Finally, any visible aid
program to Iraq's enemy, Iran, would most likely result in
expulsion of the Soviets from Iraq.
These demands for politically calculated economic efforts
must be balanced with domestic difficulties which plague the
Soviet economy. The United States National Foreign Assessment
Center has provided a grim outlook picture for the Soviet
Union. The Soviet economy slowed to a crawl in 1978-79.
The average annual growth rate at 2.1 percent was the lowest
for any period since World War II. Output declined in agricul-
ture and registered only modest gains in industry, construction,
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transportation, communications, trade and services. Factor
productivity registered negative growth in 1978-79. There has
been a virtual leveling-off of oil output, a decline in coal
production, a major rise in raw material costs, and a decline
in Russian investment. The Soviet economic problems are
structurally rooted and will restrict growth through much of
the 1980' s. The domestic condition of the Soviet economy,
coupled with the political sensitivities involved in aid and
trade issues between Iraq and Iran, will be important factors
in Soviet policy decisions.
Another significant domestic constraint to foreign
policy is the large Central Asian Muslim population in the
Soviet Union and the links between these people and the Muslims
in Iran and Iraq. These ties are both religious and ethnic
in nature and are active in the Soviet Union. The two major
religious branches of Islam, Sunni and Shi' a, are well repre-
sented in the U.S.S.R. Ninety-five percent of Soviet Muslims
are Turkic , Iranian and Caucasian Sunnis who have maintained
continuous, though limited, contact with the religious centers
abroad such as Mecca and Medina. The second branch of Islam is
represented by the three million Soviet Shiites whose spiritual
centers are located in Iraq (Najaf and Karbala) and Iran (Meshad
1 01
and Qom)
. Soviet Muslims also identify with Muslim brethren
abroad through ethnic kinship and language. The southern bor-
ders of the U.S.S.R. are purely artificial and do not reflect
any natural geographic or national divisions. These bonds of
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religion and ethnic kinship have made for a complicated rela-
tionship between Soviet Muslims and the Islamic world outside
i 02its borders.
The Muslims of Central Asia are well aware of the events
in Afghanistan, Iran and the Iraqi-Iranian War. Persian broad-
casts originating in Tabriz and Teheran are followed with
interest by Soviet Azeris and Turkmen. J The resurgence of
Islam, the anti-imperialist nature, and the phenomenon of
Khomeinism, have sensitized the peoples of Central Asia to the
events in Iran. Although the impact of these influences is
difficult to measure, it is an important factor in Soviet domes-
tic politics and can be destabilizing to Soviet unity.
As discussed earlier in this report, ideology plays a
secondary role to politics in state -to -state relations with
Iran and Iraq. However, historical ties with leftist forces
in these two countries and the importance of Moscow as the
fatherland of Marxist-Leninist thought act together to constrain
Soviet foreign policy. Ideology is a legitimizing factor in
internal Soviet politics as well as in international relations.
The Soviet leaders base their claim to loyalty and obedience on
their ability to correctly interpret and execute the "laws of
history" as defined by Marx and Lenin. Ideology, justifies
the power of the Russian political elite and communist doctrine
is an important ingredient in shaping Soviet foreign policy.
Therefore, the leadership cannot abandon the leftist forces in
Iran and Iraq or be viewed as discarding communist doctrine
Gk

entirely in political relations. To do so would entail a
domestic risk by decreasing the legitimacy of the present
leadership.
Militarily, for the Soviet Union 1980 was a very active
year. There were 80,000-100,000 Soviet troops engaged in serious
fighting in Afghanistan, scores of advisors abroad in Africa,
Latin America, Asia and the Middle East, thirty-one Soviet
divisions stationed in the Warsaw Pact countries and many more
located on the Sino-Soviet border. The Soviet Navy spent approx-
imately 60,000 ship days deployed out of area, Soviet military
expenditures approached $175 billion, and arms transfers totalled
nearly $10 billion. -3 In addition, there were several important
events which created an atmosphere of uncertainty in Soviet bor-
der regions:
1. As a result of the December 1979 Soviet invasion, President
Carter declared in his January 1980 State of the Union message
that the Persian Gulf was a "vital American interest" and U.S.
military forces were significantly enhanced in the Indian Ocean
and Arabian Sea. In addition, the United States opened nego-
tiations with Oman, Somalia and Kenya for military basing rights,
stepped-up development of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), and
increased the military build-up on Diego Garcia.
2. In May 1980, after several days of national rioting, mar-
tial law was declared in South Korea; the government cabinet
resigned and Lt. Gen. Chun Doo Hwan assumed control over a mil-
itary government.
3. The national crisis in Poland which began with work stop-
pages in July, caused the downfall of Polish leader Edward Gierek,
and the formation of a national labor union.
k. Following several months of rising tension, a Turkish
military coup occurred in September and martial law was declared
throughout that nation.
5. The Iranian-Iraqi War which commenced on 22 September 1980.
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The events and circumstances described above, while
not hampering Soviet military capabilities, would certainly
cause state planners to carefully consider the "correlation
of forces" in the Iran-Iraq War as well as the U.S.S.R.'s
global responsibilities. One additional concern which might
be considered a domestic military constraint has been the poor
showing of the Red Army against the Afghan rebels and the dis-
mal performance of the Soviet-equipped and trained Iraqi forces.
Soviet planners may be sensitive to the loss of prestige which
results from these military setbacks to the U.S.S.R.'s super-
power image. The implication of these military variables is
not to discount the utility of military deterrence in the Iranian-
Iraqi War, or to argue that Moscow's aims will be limited and
defensive in the Middle East. Rather, it is suggested that the
Soviet planners have added emphasis for assuming a cautious
stance in their policy-option deliberations regarding this war.
The final, and quite possibly » most important domestic
consideration are the dynamics of the Soviet political system.
Recent writings indicate that there is a highly important inter-
connection between Soviet domestic and foreign policy and that
decision making in the Brezhnev regime reflects the results of
consensus building efforts among the political elite. The
fact remains that Leonid Brezhnev is in firm control of Soviet
politics and that the party elite will carefully consider the
present government's performance before the inevitable succession




the unravelling of the SALT process, the turmoil within the
Socialist family of nations, and the slowdown in the Soviet
economy have made the present leadership extremely sensitive
and cautiously conservative in their foreign policy decisions.
We see evidence of this conservatism in several areas.
In the recently concluded twenty-sixth Party Congress the
entire Soviet Politburo was reinstalled without a single change
in the political leadership. According to veteran observers,
this is the first time since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917
that the CPSU has emerged from a party congress without making
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any changes to the leadership roster. A second example is
the overall restraint with which the Soviets have dealt with
the Reagan Administration, despite hardline U.S. declared
policy in Central America, Europe and the Middle East. Brezhnev,
in an astute political move, has even gone so far as to propose
a summit with Reagan to discuss U.S. -Soviet differences. A
final conservative illustration is the remarkable patience that
the Soviet leadership has demonstrated in the Polish crisis
despite the vital position that Poland occupies in the Warsaw
Pact in terms of geo-strategic location, military and economic
potential, and size of population.
The lessons that can be applied to the Iranian-Iraqi
War from this brief discussion of domestic constraints are that
the present Soviet leadership have many limitations as well as
capabilities to weigh prior to deciding on a policy course to
follow, and the policy selected will be slowly and deliberately
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formed by risk-conscious conservative leaders. This policy
will be designed to maximize long-term benefits to the Soviet
Union, and will be implemented carefully so as not to foreclose
options and reduce Moscow's flexibility. It is also important
to re-emphasize that Moscow's primary objective is to protect
the existing Soviet empire
.
2 . The Regional Level
At this level of analysis there are several actors and
issues to consider including the nations which border on Iran
and Iraq, the Persian Gulf states, the Arab states, the Pales-
tinians and the Israelis. What are the consequences of Soviet
actions at this level? What are the costs and benefits of
adopting a pro -Iraqi or a pro -Iranian stance? How do these
regional players enter into the Soviet policy making structure?
Let us begin by looking at the war in terms of its effects on
the Middle East.
The Iranian-Iraqi War fractionalized the region into
three camps: the pro-Iraqi nations, the pro-Iranian states,
109
and the non-aligned. y The states that support Iraq can fur-
ther be divided into active and passive support categories.
As of this writing, the only active supporter of Iraq is
Jordan. King Hussein announced very quickly his total support
of Iraq in its conflict to protect Arab lands and Arab legiti-
mate rights. Jordan has demonstrated its support by:
authorizing Iraqi planes to land at Jordanian airfields in
order to protect them from Iranian attack; opening the port
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of Aqaba for the delivery of Iraqi supplies; the provision of
Jordanian commercial transport to deliver goods overland to
Baghdad; placing the Jordanian military forces on a state of
alert; and sending medical supplies and personnel to Iraq to
help care for wounded combatants. The King has also offered
Jordanian military assistance to Saddam Hussain which has not
110
as yet "been called into service
.
The passive supporters of Iraq include Saudi Arabia,
Oman, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. These states
have abstained from official expressions of support for Iraq
but are ideologically supportive of Saddam Hussain' s Pan-Arab
111
motives in seeking to regain "Arab territories" from Iran.
Also, these states have felt threatedned by the Teheran funda-
mentalists' exhortations to Gulf Shi'ite Muslims to join in
the Islamic Revolution. These passive supporters of Iraq have
not made any official pronouncements to-date, but unofficial
radio and newspaper backing for Iraq has not been disclaimed
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either. At the outset of the war, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
and other Gulf states also acted, in a practical fashion, by
declaring a state of alert for their Armed Forces and have
fortified aerial defenses.
The declared pro -Iranian states in the Middle East are
Syria and Libya. The Syrian support of Iran is officially cited
as being in the best interest of the Arab states in the Arab-
Israeli conflict in which Iran has declared support for the
Arab side. Unofficially, Syria and Iraq have a long-standing
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disagreement regarding leadership of Baath Socialism and
Presidents Assad and Hussain have an intense dislike for each
other on ideological, political and religious grounds. The
Syrian support of Iran stops well short of entering into open
hostilities with Iraq due to Syrian military involvement in
Lebanon and fear of Israel. Libya's backing for revolutionary
Iran centers on ideological support for Islamic revival. Libya
is virtually isolated in the Arab world and Col. Qaddafi's
bolstering of Iran represents his frustration and inability
113
to fulfill a leadership role in Arab affairs. J
Those states who have remained neutral, but concerned
about the outcome of the present war include Egypt, Pakistan,
Turkey and Israel. Turkey and Pakistan's concerns are prin-
cipally economic and security-based. Both nations border on
the hostile region and depend upon oil imports from the Persian
Gulf to fuel their respective economies. Egypt's President
Sadat, while emphasizing that the fighting only benefits the
Soviet Union, has exhorted the United States to intervene and
overthrow the Khomeini regime. Sadat's position no doubt
reflects his continued support for the Pahlavi family and not
his enthusiasm for Saddam Hussain with whom Sadat is competing
for leadership of the Arab world. Israel's interest in the
conflict is to evaluate Iraqi military performance for future
11 ?
strategic planning purposes. J One additional actor who has
declared neutrality in this conflict is the Palestine Liberation
Organization. PLO leader Yasser Arafat travelled to Baghdad and
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Teheran during the first week of the war in an unsuccessful
mediation attempt. The PLO , like the Soviet Union, is an
ally of both warring states and, unlike Moscow, has virtually
1 1 (^
nothing to gain from prolonged hostilities.
The Soviet dilemma in the Middle East is that the
Iranian-Iraqi conflict splits Moscow's allies into factions
on both sides of the war. Almost any Soviet Gulf policy during
this war will alienate some nations and will impede short-term
progress towards attainment of regional goals. If the Soviet
Union strongly bolsters the Iraqis and provides substantial
military aid to Saddam Hussain, it will risk progress made with
Soviet allies Syria and Libya as well as destroy any possibility
of gaining influence in Iran. Strong support for Iraq would
ultimately threaten the remaining Gulf states, Egypt, and
Israel who are not pleased with the prospect of Iraqi ascendency
in the Arab world, OPEC, and the Persian Gulf. Weak or in-
consistent support for Iraq could discredit the U.S.S.R. as
an ally and reduce its potential for long-term gains in the
region.
Alternatively, strong support for Iran would cause an
alienation of the Arab states, destroy gains made in Iraq,
and reduce Soviet influence in this essential region. Weak
support for Iran will most likely prove unacceptable to the
Iranians, would prolong the conflict indefinitely, and could
be viewed by the remaining regional actors as a Soviet attempt
to subvert the Persian Gulf. Under these circumstances it is
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understandable why the Kremlin would prefer to avoid choosing
between countries, wait for a break in the war, and consider
the options and possible impacts of Soviet actions on the
international system.
3. The Global Level
This is a very important level of analysis for Soviet
politicians. It is at this aggregation that decision making
involves its greatest risks and potential gains. Among the
actors which Moscow views in terms of response to Soviet
policy, only one nation in this instance is crucial, the
United States. Other actors, such as the Peoples' Republic
of China, NATO, the Warsaw Pact nations, and Japan are important
for Moscow to incorporate into their strategic policy decisions,
but only the U.S. capability in the Persian Gulf could tip the
scale far enough to render the evidence gleaned from the other
levels of analysis as less important. For it is only the United
States which could seriously oppose the Soviet Union militarily
at the nuclear level. It is the global correlation of forces
tempered by U.S. willingness to intervene in the Middle East
which Soviet decision makers must contemplate and balance in
their response to the Iranian-Iraqi War.
The Soviet Union did not have to wait long to determine
what the United States policy in the Iran-Iraq War would be.
From the outset, the Carter Administration announced its
neutrality in the conflict and continued its longstanding
preoccupation with the hostage crisis in Iran. It was quickly
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agreed therefore to exchange letters with the United States
to cement the Carter position in a public fashion. Although
the emphasis on the agreed position was in regard to military
restraint in the war, the American emphasis on the hostage
issue and the impending U.S. presidential elections assured
that the United States focus would be distracted from the
Iran-Iraq crisis. This left the Soviet Union relatively free
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to implement its own strategy in the Gulf war. '
D. THE BALANCE SHEET
A review of the analysis presented here indicates that in
the selection of an ally in the present conflict, there is no
clear winner. Based on the Soviet goals of security, the
removal of Western influence, and ultimately exerting Soviet
control in the Persian Gulf, Iran appears to be of longer-
term importance in the region than Iraq. Iran's geo-strategic
location, size and characteristics , larger population, and
mineral resources would give Iran an overall higher rating
in a net assessment of potential power. However, Iraq is a
very significant nation in Southwest Asia. It is presently
the most powerful Arab state, it has vast mineral wealth, and
a growing middle class society. There are also several polit-
ical intangibles that Moscow factors into their assessment
such as the Iraqi position among the Arab states, the leader-
ship potential that Saddam Hussain has exhibited, and the
warming relations between Iraq and the West. Also, President
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Hussain is scheduled to replace Cuban Prime Minister Fidel
Castro in 1982 as the unofficial spokesman of the Non-Aligned
nations for the next three years. The balance sheet is
inconclusive and Moscow's policy in the Iran-Iraq struggle
reflects the dilemma of choosing sides.
E. SOVIET STRATEGY AND THE WAR
Moscow's solution to the challenges presented by the
Iran-Iraq War has been to try, in its own way, to be even-
handed on all issues which surround the conflict and to fre-
quently call for an end to military hostilities. From a
Kremlin perspective, this policy provides the widest latitude
for exploiting opportunities without becoming mired in the
process of choosing sides. The policy of neutrality also
reflects Moscow's lack of control over the belligerents and
other regional actors. Much as it had during the initial
phases of the Ethiopia-Somali conflict in 1977. Moscow has
sought to demonstrate friendship toward both sides. The
U.S.S.R. news media initially covered the events of the war
in a uniform fashion by first presenting daily Baghdad's
military dispatches and reposts on the fighting, and then
1 1 ft
similar dispatches from Teheran. On occasion, these two
views were supplemented by dispatches from third countries.
The reactions selected for use in the Soviet press, usually
included a call for an end to hostilities vas well as under-
scoring the dangers created for all parties in the region.
Moscow avoided taking sides as to responsibility for the
7^

outbreak of the war by generally stating that the conflict
was the result of long-standing territorial differences and
was a purely regional dispute.
The strongest theme to emerge from the initial stages of
the war reporting by the U.S.S.R. was that the forces of
imperialism were using the conflict as an excuse to bolster
11Q
their military presence in the Persian Gulf. 7 Moscow's
leaders sought to make the United States Gulf activities the
central issue in the Iran-Iraq conflict. President Brezhnev,
while speaking at a dinner in honor of the visiting Indian
President Reddy on 30 September, declared that
"It can hardly be thought that it was simply a tragic
misunderstanding
. . .No, some people are obviously
trying to turn this conflict to their profit. You will
ask, who? They are the people who are unhappy with the
cohesion of the anti-imperialist forces in the Near and
Middle East. They are those who want to establish their
control over Near and Middle East oil who again dream of
turning Iran into a military base and a gendarme post of
imperialism. "120
Other Soviet reporters were not so diplomatic in their
denouncements. Frequent commentaries in major Soviet news-
papers charged that the U.S. was benefitting from the war,
was preparing to intervene militarily, and would shortly
attempt to occupy the oil fields of the Gulf. One regular
object of Soviet assault has been the U.S. and Allied naval
forces in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. The Soviets also
lashed out at the four AWACS aircraft deployed to Saudi Arabia,
charging that U.S. presence was artificially fanning the flames
in the Gulf to further American interests. Moscow's pronounce-
ments against "gunboat diplomacy" have continued throughout
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the conflict and were particularly vehement during joint
U. S. -Egyptian exercises conducted in November 1980.
Soviet propagandists have worked overtime to exploit the
instability in the Gulf. Other actors have been assailed,
especially President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, and the Israelis.
The NATO countries have also been chided for their participa-
tion in the Allied naval force build-up in the Arabian Sea.
Moscow has also manipulated the war for its own diplomatic
gains most notably in Syria with whom the Soviet Union signed
a twenty year Friendship and Cooperation Treaty on 8 October
1980. In addition to arming Iraq, the Soviet Union has be-
come a major supplier of weapons to Syria, Libya and South
Yemen (PDRY) , and has been courting Jordan's King Hussein
with offers of arms and other military support.
Evidence suggests that the Soviet style of neutrality
includes actively supplying both belligerents with limited
quantities of arms, while offering larger economic and polit-
12 1ical incentives to Iran. ~ Although the Soviet Union appar-
ently had no role in starting the hostilities they have been
quick to exploit both sides for short and long-term potential
gains. One analyst's viewpoint is that the Soviets are not
enchanted with the war, nonetheless prolonged, controlled
122 . .
conflict offers many benefits to the Kremlin. By providing
limited quantities of arms to Iraq and Iran, the Soviets may
be creating a situation where they are able to step-in and
act as mediators to end the war. Certainly a Pax Sovietica
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that would halt the hostilities would enhance Moscow's pres-
tige in the area and may help to secure long-term allies in
much the same fashion that India tilted towards the U.S.S.R.
following the Soviet-mediated peace agreement in the 1966
border war between Pakistan and India. Soviet manipulation
of the arms flow into either camp also offers the prospect
of influencing the direction of the Iranian Revolution, and
could ultimately determine the political fate of Iraq's
Saddam Hussain. By affecting the military capability of
Iran and Iraq, the U.S.S.R. helps to make the war more stable
from their perspective and reduces the necessity for an early
decision in Soviet policy in the Gulf. Russian influence also
enables the Kremlin to maintain a closer tactical picture of
the fighting and to measure and exploit the respective short-
comings of the warring parties.
It has been demonstrated in several Third World struggles
that the Soviet Union's traditional diplomatic approach is to
attempt to win influence on both sides of the conflict. This
was the case in the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan border wars,
the 1977 Somali-Ethiopian crisis, the 1978-79 Iranian Revolu-
tion, as well as in the current Iranian-Iraqi War. The Soviets
would also prefer a position of control in the region to less
substantive influence and it is certain that the Kremlin would
favor long-term presence to shortened gains. The importance
of the region to the U.S.S.R. outweighs the value of either
Iran or Iraq as individual allies. This was underscored by
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President Brezhnev's efforts in December 1980 to seek a long-
term security program for the Persian Gulf. The Soviet
leaders' five -point program sought commitments from the United
States, other Western powers, China, Japan, and all other in-
terested states to:
1. not establish foreign military bases in the Persian
Gulf; not deploy nuclear weapons in the region;
2. not employ or threaten force against the nations of the
region and not to interfere in their internal affairs;
3. respect the non-aligned status chosen by governments of
the region; not to draw them into military alliances;
k. respect the sovereign rights of states in the region to
their natural resources;
5. not raise any obstacles or threats to normal commerce
or to the use of the sea lanes linking the Gulf states with
other countries of the worid. 123
Although these proposals seem conciliatory and constructive
on the surface, recalling the Soviet aims for removing all
Western influence in the Persian Gulf leads to an alternative
viewpoint. Brezhnev's program would not affect Soviet involve-
ment in Afghanistan, PDRY, or Ethiopia, while attempting to
exclude U.S. forces from being stationed in Saudi Arabia,
Oman or Somalia. The call against the use of force would not
prevent the Soviet Union from providing the same sort of fra-
ternal assistance that is currently operating in Afghanistan
as mandated by the bilateral treaties in-force with PDRY,
Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and now, Syria. The commitment to
respect the non-aligned status of selected governments could
be used to prevent regional mutual defense and security pacts
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from being established or supported by the United States or
its Western Allies. Economically and politically, the pro-
posal guaranteeing the sovereignty of natural resources is
an effective propaganda statement which is unlikely to affect
the Soviet Union, but in the event of another oil embargo
would present serious diplomatic restraints to the West.
The final item on the Brezhnev program is the only one which
would significantly benefit the industrialized nations. The
U.S.S.R. has, at present, little concern with the sea lanes
in the Gulf region and nearly all their economic requirements
could be met by land route and pipeline systems. Perhaps
this statement is designed to "heighten the interest in the
West" and stimulate debate on the Brezhnev-proposed Gulf
peace program.
Ultimately, the Brezhnev five-point program is a deliberate
propaganda move designed to enhance the Soviet Union's role in
the Middle East. The overall effect of a Western acceptance
of these proposals would be to reduce Western influence in the
region and further exacerbate the balance -of -forces problem
125
which already exists in this area. ^ The Soviet Union's
massive land-based forces could prove to be the deciding factor
that influences future regional political, ideological and
economic policies. Additionally, the view of the sectional
actors themselves might be that the superpowers, by enacting
these proposals, were preparing to sub-divide the area into
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spheres of influence in a return to colonial imperialism.
The potential gains for the Soviet Union in this new role
of peacemaker would have long-term negative "balance of
power effects for the United States and the West. It is
to the realm of strategic implications for the United
States and Naval policy to which we next turn.
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE NAVY
"Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by
any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital
interests of the United States of America, and such
an assault will be repelled by any means necessary,




Two themes are dominant in this announcement of the
"Carter Doctrine:" the Persian Gulf region is an area of
vital American interest, and the United States will use mil-
itary force to defend the Gulf. The President's pronouncement
of concern and willingness to respond was not a new course for
American policy, but confirmation of a long-standing strategy
for this area. The policy determination that "the security
of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is vital to
the security of the United States" was first made in 1946 at
. . . 127
the time of the Azerbaijan crisis by President Truman. The
objective of U.S. policy since that time has been to contain
the Soviet threat. The Southwest Asian region has been the
focus of several attempts to build security links to prevent
the intrusion of the U.S.S.R. into the area. The Truman Doc-
trine of 19^7, the formation of CENTO, the Eisenhower Doctrine
of 1957, and the Nixon Doctrine of 1969, all stressed collective
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security measures in attempting to exclude the Soviets from
the region and to protect Western interests. The U.S. policy
of containment failed. Russian influence and presence in the
Middle East has survived Western efforts and regional policy
setbacks and the U.S.S.R.'s influence continues to be impor-
tant in Gulf politics.
The Soviet threat is a prominent theme in current U.S.
national security literature. This is especially true of the
writings that deal with Iran and the Persian Gulf. The twin
threats of Communism and the Red Army are favorite items for
discussion in this post -Afghanistan environment. What is the
nature of this threat? How does it affect American national
security objectives in Southwest Asia? What are the implica-
tions and situations that are likely to evolve based on the
current assessment? Finally, what is the U.S. Navy's role,
its capabilities, and limitations in responding to a Soviet
threat in the Gulf? These topics will be considered in the
framework of Moscow's security, economic and ideological
objectives for Iran and the region as outlined in preceding
chapters.
B. U.S. OBJECTIVES
Successive American administrations have defined U.S.
goals in Southwest Asia in three basic areas. First, the
freedom of access to the region's resources upon which the
West is seriously dependent. (See Table 5-1) Second, the





and Persian Gulf Oil
United European
1979 States Community Japan
a. Oil as percent of
total energy consumed ^7 $$ 71
b. Percent of oil
imported kk 87 100
c. Percent of oil imported
from Persian Gulf 30 57 73
d. Persian Gulf oil as
percent of total energy
consumed 8 28 51
Source: John M. Collins, U.S. -Soviet Military Balance:
Book IV. Far East, Middle East Assessments , Congressional
Research Service, The Library of Congress, July 1980, p. 59
83

of the state of Israel. Since the 1973 rise of OPEC influence
and the quadrupling of world petroleum prices, a fourth goal
has gained importance, namely, the promotion of friendly and
cooperative relations with the Arab States of the Middle East.
Closely associated to all of these goals is the prevention of
a major regional war, especially a fifth Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Persian Gulf oil fields are extremely important to the
United States. This is not because of direct U.S. dependence
on the oil resources of the region without which the American
economy would stumble, but continue to function. Rather, it
is the possible long-term implications of Soviet control over
these resources which threatens the United States. Soviet
command over this essential area would enable the U.S.S.R. to
directly influence the oil supplies upon which Western Europe
and Japan are so vitally dependent. This could lead to the
weakening of the North Atlantic Alliance and would severely
constrain the independence of the Western nations and Japan.
The dissolution of NATO and a decline in U.S. security, economic
vitality, and world power through influence, could certainly
follow in this scenario. This is an ultimate objective of
Soviet policy and for this reason, the United States should
do everything that it can to avoid Soviet dominance in the




The Soviet Union's ability to threaten Iran and U.S.
interests in the Persian Gulf is significant. The military
capability of the U.S.S.R. is enormous and continues to grow
1 29
at a rapid rate. y The Western debate on Soviet capabilities
differs principally as to the intent of Soviet leaders for the
applications of this power, not on the magnitude of Soviet
military forces. It is readily acknowledged that the Soviet
Union has achieved strategic parity in nuclear forces, that
they have outspent the United States in defense appropriations
by more than $100 billion in the past decade, and that the
U.S.S.R. leads the United States in virtually every major
. . . 130
category in conventional and strategic military comparisons. ^
In the vicinity of Iran, Soviet power is manifested in part
by the twenty-three combat divisions and three hundred strike
aircraft in the Central Asian Military Districts, the esti-
mated 80,000 combat troops in Afghanistan, and the twenty-one
naval vessals which comprise the current Soviet Indian Ocean
Squadron on patrol in adjacent seas. In addition, the U.S.S.R. 's
ability to project power includes seven operational airborne
divisions and the demonstrated airlift capacity to deliver
these forces and their supporting equipment to the region in
a rapid fashion. In opposition, the United States has thirty-
two combat and support vessals including two carrier battle
groups. The nearest U.S. military base is on the island of
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Diego Garcia, located in the center of the Indian Ocean some
2500 nautical miles from the Persian Gulf. The imbalance of
1 31forces in-being could hardly be more distinct. J
It is clear that the Soviet conventional military capabil-
ity in Iran and the Gulf is superior to that of the United
States. The shortfalls have been identified and the U.S.
defense establishment is working hard to reduce the imbalances
and upgrade American military capabilities by a variety of
measures. The question that remains is what practical value
does outside military force contain for the Gulf region?
Although the Soviet capabilities are significant, do they
represent a viable instrument which can be successfully em-
ployed in this theater? It is the conclusion of this study
that Soviet military abilities are useful in that they can,
and do, influence some local governmental decisions, but that
the direct employment of Soviet military power in Iran is not
a likely policy option due to the risks and uncertainties
involved in such an intervention.
Several of the problems that face the Soviet planners in
Iran, especially in the context of the ongoing Iran-Iraq War
were outlined in Chapter IV such as the domestic constraints
on Soviet power, the regional considerations and the global
political and military framework. In specific military terms,
the obstacles of intervening in Iran place severe limitations
on any Russian invasion attempt. Based on the Soviet's Afghan
experience, the U.S.S.R. would most likely have to commit
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upwards of 300f000 men, or three times as many forces to
occupy Iran in an attempt to pacify the country and control
the Iranian oil fields. The supply lines' requirements
leading back to the Soviet Union would be extensive. The
Kremlin would have to import countless technicians and
workers into Iran, as well as make a large capital outlay
to restore and then maintain Iranian oil production which
would further degrade Moscow's energy development and domes-
tic economic plans. These troops and technicians could be
absent for a long-term period which would significantly
detract from Soviet capabilities in other theaters of opera-
tion. Although they share a common border, it is still five
hundred miles to the Iranian oil fields of Khuzestan via a
land route from Central Asia, and roughly seven hundred air
miles from Afghanistan. Any Soviet operations attempted from
seaward approaches to Iran would have to contend with U.S.
carrier-based air power.
There are other important military factors that would
impede Soviet progress in Iran: the Iranian road system is
rudimentary; the railroad networks are nominal; water is
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scarce in many areas of Iran; and food supplies are scanty.
The Persian Gulf itself is also at or beyond the extreme
ranges of most Soviet fighter and attack aircraft based on
U.S.S.R. territory. Russian airborne operations, parachute
assaults, and linkup operations utilized to seize and hold
advance positions would all lack air cover until Moscow could
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neutralize, occupy, or control southern Iranian air bases.
Soviet naval units would benefit from some land-based long
range aviation, but they could not rely on complete land-
based air cover or logistics support operations.
At sea, Soviet maritime units would have to contend with
Allied forces including American, French, and occasional
British and Australian units, as well as the tremendous
volume of commercial shipping in the region. -^ Soviet
havens, anchorages and resupply areas such as Socotra Island
off the African Horn, the regions near the Comoro Islands
between Tanzania and the Malagasy Republic, and the Cargados
Carajos Shoals near Mauritius as well as the Chagos Archi-
1 3^pelago near Diego Garcia would all be open to attack. J
Soviet naval forces including surface and submarine units,
could inflitrate into threatening positions in peacetime and
possibly exert a substantial toll on Allied shipping, but
would find no safe support facilities anywhere in the Indian
Ocean region. Their principal problem would be how to deliver
attacks and retire homewards through the gauntlet of Allied
1 3<
naval forces at choke points around the basin. -'-'
There are alternative military options in the Gulf to
limited or general conventional combat. The Soviets could
conduct offensive mine warfare to close the Straits of Hormuz
and attempt to impose a political settlement in the region.
Alternatively, the U.S.S.R. could cripple selected petroleum
port facilities such as refineries, pumping stations, storage
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facilities, and piers by surgical air strikes or covert
operations. Moscow could attempt these operations with Soviet
forces or enlist the assistance of proxy forces from Cuba,
Ethiopia, the PDRY or the PLO . In any event, the Kremlin
would risk facing determined U.S. , Allied and Middle Eastern
opposition which could escalate very quickly from the conven-
tional or limited environment envisioned to tactical nuclear
weapons and possibly strategic exchanges in a spasm war.
There are many other escalation options that the Soviet
Union could consider including diversions in other theaters
and interdiction. For example, Soviet leaders could divert
United States public opinion and Armed Forces concentrations
by increasing tensions in Berlin, Korea, Southeast Asia or
the Caribbean. This escalation of tension in other regions
would stretch already thinned American and Allied forces to
an unacceptable limit and significantly increase re -supply
and logistics difficulties for the Persian Gulf. The
U.S.S.R. might also choose to conduct anti-shipping cam-
paigns in the Far East, the Mediterranean, the North Sea or
Indian Ocean regions along Western Sea Lines of Communication
(SLOC's). Utilizing its large long range aviation forces and
pre-positi oned submarine force, Moscow could quickly slow
Western re -supply efforts and wreak havoc with European and
Japanese economic performance. The Soviets might be able
to thus separate and isolate U.S. and Allied forces and pre-
vent a concentrated defensive effort from being mounted in
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the Persian Gulf while conserving Soviet strength in the
region. To exercise any of these alternatives the Soviet
Union would risk the outbreak of global hostilities that
would make the Persian Gulf benefits shrink in importance.
The bottom line in this discussion of Soviet military
abilities is that the U.S.S.R. possesses the requisite forces
to intervene in Iran if:
1. the correlation of forces in the region continues to
improve in the Kremlin's favor;
2. the Iranian state should collapse into civil war and
Soviet security is perceived to be severely threatened;
3. the opportunity to provide limited assistance in response
to a call by a legitimate faction inside Iran were to present
itself ;
k, the United States were to introduce ground forces into
the region
,
There are numerous possibilities and scenarios that one could
devise which might prompt a Soviet military response in Iran.
To that end, some authors have postulated that one motivational
factor for the Soviet decision to introduce troops into neigh-
boring Afghanistan was to improve Soviet strategic position
in relation to the Persian Gulf. J Certainly one of the
outcomes of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has been to
bring Soviet air and land forces into a favorable position to
influence not only Iranian developments but also to within
350 miles of the vital Straits of Hormuz which increases the
sensitivity of Pakistan and India as well as the Western
nations to the presence of Soviet power in Southwest Asia.
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However, the risks surrounding Soviet initiation of hostil-
ities in the region would be extraordinary given the United
States announcements and claims to the vital nature of the
region. The combination of American declaratory policy,
underscored by the Reagan landslide election victory, and
the Soviet military uncertainty in achieving regional goals
at an acceptable cost leads the conservative Brezhnev regime
to continue a policy of caution in Iran and the Iran-Iraq War.
This is not to imply that the Soviet Union will not ex-
ploit opportunities which arise in the region. This is
especially true when the risk of U.S. involvement is diminished
It is this author's belief that one of the important factors in
the U.S.S.R.'s decision to intervene in Afghanistan was the U.S,
...preoccupation with the hostage crisis in neighboring Iran.
Soviet decision makers most likely decided that the Carter
Administration's indecisive response to the Iranian seizure
of U.S. embassy personnel would be repeated towards the Soviet
involvement in an area peripheral to American vital interests.
Although the U.S. response was more vigorous than was perhaps
anticipated, the Soviet Union did not let the opportunity pass.
One may reasonably assume , based on the significance of the
region and the difficulty for U.S. planners in making a cred-
ible move into Southwest Asia, that the U.S.S.R. would be
tempted to consider bold action in the event of future oppor-
tunities which might arise in Iran.
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The United States' problems in exercising a credible
military option in this area are also grave. From a spatial
perspective alone, the Persian Gulf is more remote from the
U.S. than any other available source of petroleum imports.
Airline distances to the region are greater than 6,000
nautical miles from the American eastern seaboard. Sea
lanes via the Suez Canal, or Cape Route are much longer.
The principal problem facing United States strategic planners
is that of action or reaction time. The continuing debate
on the viability of an American Rapid Deployment Force (RDF)
to meet Persian Gulf situations requiring military forces
1 37is sufficiently described elsewhere. J{ The paucity of U.S.
airlift and sealift assets continues to limit the useful
applications of such a force in the area. At the present
time it is acknowledged that the RDF's most useful function
in a Gulf action involving Soviet military forces would be
to demonstrate U.S. resolve and act as a "tripwire" which
would assure a larger commitment of American power in the
138
region. J
Under the prevailing conditions, which dictate caution
in the application of military force by the U.S.S.R. and
the United States, one should consider what could bring
superpower military units into the region. The principal
threat that this author sees to U.S. national security
objectives is the instability and volatile nature of the
region itself. The two issues which have historically
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provided multiple opportunities for Soviet political gains in
the region are the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian
issue . There are many other regional problems which produce
opportunities for Russian influence and persuasion without
resorting to military forces. Some of these issues include
the presence of restive ethnic minorities, religious divisions,
unsettled boundary disputes, modernization, government and
leadership legitimacy, primordialism, and most recently, the
revolutionary developments in Iran. The ability of the U.S.S.R.
to foment unrest and destabilize local regimes presently favor-
able to the West is the most "dangerous security issue in the
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region." ^ y This threat does not equate to the mass communi-
zation of Southwest Asia, or the direct Soviet occupation of
the Persian Gulf oil fields and the resultant economic strangu-
lation of the West. Rather, the threat that faces the United
States and its Allies is the prospect of the failure of local
deterrence and the lack of escalation-control devices in a
regional conflict which could spill over into a superpower
confrontation. The lack of resolution of "internal" problems
in the region is viewed by area specialists and regional actors
alike as the primary challenge to security and prosperity in
the Gulf. As in the past, the major impediment to stability
is the unresolved Arab-Israeli issue. The threat of war has
been most recently demonstrated by the events of May 1981
surrounding the Syrian introduction of Soviet surface-to-air
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missiles into Lebanon which, at the time of this writing,
remains as a potentially serious and unresolved issue in
the Middle East.
Regional issues and rivalries can be viewed as the most
likely catalysts leading to a U. S. -U. S.S.R. military confron-
tation in Iran and the Persian Gulf. If one accepts the
premise that the problems which face the United States in
Southwest Asia are basically political, then there are a
number of options which lend themselves to analysis and the
formulation of a coherent regional policy. However, given
the number of regional issues that could lead to military
actions by the superpowers, the primary task for U.S. national
strategic planners is to determine how to act in a crisis sit-
uation to contain a Middle Eastern problem and reduce the
threat of escalation, while seeking to achieve U.S. national
objectives without risking a military collision with locally
superior Soviet forces. In the event of hostilities, the
United States Navy's role in Southwest Asia could be decisive
to the success or failure of such a plan.
D. THE NAVAL RESPONSE
The difficulty of securing Western insterests in Iran and
the Persian Gulf requires, in one analyst's words, "a (Western)
response that is multi-leveled, comprising military, political,
and economic instruments that are coordinated with allies,
regional and extra-regional, that are buttressed by policies
in adjacent regions." 1 * While the United States continues
9^

to seek regional political and economic solutions that are
lasting, it is prudent to consider the various facets of a
military response in the Persian Gulf. It is the military
question which this assessment will focus upon. It is the
author's contention that, pending the formation of a truly
operational RDF and the improvement of U.S. airlift and
sealift capabilities, the Navy represents the only credible
United States military instrument in the Persian Gulf.
Throughout the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution, and especially
during the fourteen month hostage crisis, the U.S. Navy was
the only visible expression of Western power in the Persian
Gulf region. The carrier battle groups and Marine amphibious
forces on station in the Arabian Sea played a fundamental role
in maintaining a regional superpower balance of forces. The
proximity of these forces most likely weighed heavily in the
Soviet decision to adopt a cautiously neutral policy towards
Iran and the Iran-Iraq War. The Naval forces were cited re-
peatedly in Soviet press and radio propaganda reports as the
ultimate threat to regional stability. The potential use-
fulness of these units was demonstrated in the abortive U.S.
hostage rescue attempt in April 1980 which, although unsuc-
cessful in returning the hostages, served to remind the
Iranians that their actions were not taking place in a power
vacuum. One might argue that Iran's subsequent behavior in
failing to execute the threatened mining of the Straits of
Hormuz in response to the Iraqi invasion, and indeed the
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eventual safe return of the American hostages in January 1981
were directly attributable to the presence of U.S. seaborne
forces. The continued deployment of Naval units is a
visible reminder of the military options that exist for
the West to employ in Iran and the Gulf if required.
The ground and air options are less tangible responses
because there are no U.S. client states in the immediate
vicinity who have offered basing rights for U.S. troops and
equipment. It is politically doubtful that any regional
state, other than Israel, could make such an offer. If per-
manent basing rights were implemented it could well increase
the likelihood of Soviet intervention in the region. Even if
a forward base position were to be identified, it could take
several budget years to fund, procure, and construct a suit-
able facility to support U.S. ground and air forces. Finally,
fixed base sites are vulnerable to pre-emptive attack which
would return the strategic balance in Southwest Asia to its
present lamentable condition.
The Rapid Deployment Force will significantly enhance U.S.
crisis response capabilities. The political consensus and
budget actions already implemented in support of this defense
plan are impressive. However, the final product, when tested,
equipped, and trained for combat operations, will not appear
on the international scene until 1985 or later. It will take
at least this much time to complete the necessary augmentation
of strategic airlift and sealift with such options as to build
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CX intercontinental aircraft, Roll-on Roll-off support ships,
1 Zip
and the command infrastructure to support such a force.
The RDF is not a panacea, just as Diego Garcia cannot simul-
taneously be "all things to all services" in the Indian Ocean.
Once the RDF is committed to a theater, for example into
El Salvador, Thailand, or the Persian Gulf, the United States
is back to its present reliance on naval forces to demonstrate
presence and project power in a crisis situation.
The subject of how to protect the West's oil supplies
which emanate from the Persian Gulf has received a great deal
of emphasis in recent years. The technical problems of
securing oil fields and industrial complexes ashore have been
debated by several studies. The conclusion reached by a 1980
Congressional Research Service report which focuses on defense
of the oil fields is that "success thus would depend predom-
inately on two prerequisites: slight damage to key installa-
tions and Soviet abstinence from armed intervention." J
Since neither of these conditions could be assured, the use
of military force to seize, operate, and protect oil fields
in the Persian Gulf is a dubious prospect with high risks
and potential far-reaching costs.
The same restrictions apply to a Soviet attacker. If, as
the CIA suggests, the oil fields will one day be of immense
value to the Soviet economy as well as to U.S.S.R. client
states, then the risks of military operations must also be
disconcerting to Soviet leaders. The Kremlin is faced with
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the same dilemma that exists in a NATO//\Iarsaw Pact war environ-
ment where the very object they seek, namely the European
economic base, could well be destroyed in an attempt to
realize the military attainment of the goal. The most de-
sirable solution for the Soviet Union would be to gain control
of Gulf oil without exercising the military option. This may
not be possible, however, given the limitations outlined in
this thesis, such as the U.S.S.R. 's inability to compete in
the petroleum marketplace due to declining Soviet productivity
and a lack of hard currency to conduct foreign trade. The
U.S.S.R. may also be inhibited ideologically by the lack of
appeal of Communism in the Islamic Middle East. Politically,
the Soviet measures exercised to -date have produced only limited
gains which are not irreversible.
The military option that could preserve the oil fields in-
tact while presenting the least risk to the Soviet homeland is
a limited war at sea. Such a conflict, if successfully pro-
secuted, could reduce Western influence and promote Soviet
areawide dominance without damaging the Gulf's fragile petroleum
system. The war at sea scenario could also provide a natural
escalation firebreak without jeopardizing Soviet ground and
air forces superiority in this region. Such a conflict could
be quick, decisive, and relatively low-cost. A Russian pre-
emptive attack against Diego Garcia and the carrier battle
groups in the Arabian Sea could be over in minutes and the U.S.
would be faced with the choice of:
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1. a negotiated settlement;
2. responding in kind in a limited fashion;
3. escalation of the conflict.
A Soviet attack of this nature, coupled with intense global
propaganda, and the (pro-offered) olive branch in the form
of negotiations, would place enormous pressure on American
decision makers. Given the present strategic nuclear and
conventional imbalances, it would be difficult to convince
American, Allied or Third World audiences of the necessity
to escalate a limited conflict. A U.S. credible response by
naval units would take several days or weeks to mount in the
Indian Ocean in light of the transit distances from U.S.
bases and the shortage of units in the region. It would be
very difficult to disregard the negotiations "opportunity"
under these conditions. In this situation, the outcome would
depend heavily on the size and ability of the U.S. naval forces
deployed to the region. y
The United States is well served by its maritime power in
the Indian Ocean. Navy and Marine Corps units act as a strong
deterrent to Soviet aggression. They also function as con-
spicuous and persistent reminders of U.S. interests and presence
in the region. Maritime power is an extremely flexible diplo-
matic tool which can provide visibility in critical situations
and remain unobtrusively over-the -horizon when required. Naval
presence offers freedom of action to the U.S. Government which
includes speed in intervention as well as open lines of retreat.
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Naval units do not require permanent bases and large support
elements to remain on station for extended periods. These
are some of the reasons which suggest why the Navy is best
suited and has been most often used in remote areas during
periods of unrest.
From these observations it follows that in devising a
strategy for the future in Southwest Asia, United States
national security interests requires that we maintain a
substantial naval capability and presence in the Indian Ocean.
To accomplish this, the current Administration should invest
now by beginning to build a fifth numbered U.S. Fleet as well
as a Rapid Deployment Force. In the interim, there are a
number of innovative programs and recommendations that have
been presented by Navy Department officials, scholars, journal-
ists, and laymen to increase the capabilities of present forces
These suggestions include:
1. a restructuring of Navy deployment patterns to reduce
U.S. force levels in the Mediterranean and Caribbean Seas to
augment the Indian Ocean Fleet;
2. expansion of U.S. Coast Guard responsibilities to include
the Caribbean region presently patrolled by the Navy;
3. the inclusion of Allied naval units from France, Britain,
Australia, and Japan, for example, into a formal Indian Ocean
Maritime Force ;
*K the restoration of the U.S. Navy's afloat shipyards and
supply depot system that accompanied the Pacific Fleet in the
islands-hopping campaign of World War II
;
5. a continuing search for overseas bases, homeports, docks
and repair facilities in the thirty-six littoral nations;
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6. a reactivation and modernization of retired U.S. naval
units such as USS Iowa (BB-6l), USS New Jersey (BB-62), and
the carrier USS Oriskany (CVA-3^)
.
1^6
There are also numerous proposals that deal with technology
and increasing the offensive capabilities of the Navy. Pro-
grams which this author recommends for accelerated development
and production include:
1. CG-^7 and Aegis Combat Systems for improved fleet air
defense
;
2. VTOL/VSTOL attack aircraft to diversify fleet air capabil-
ities and augment carrier aircraft operations
;
3. Tomahawk cruise missile system production in both land
and sea, long-range attack versions for installation in
submarines and surface combatants for offensive power
projection. 1^7
In sum, the naval agenda is only a portion of the general
re -armament program that the United States needs to undertake
in support of national objectives in the Persian Gulf. To
operationalize these concepts and insure continued access to
critical resources it will be necessary to focus American
production capacity, manpower, and national will on the Soviet
threat. Accordingly, we should adopt a program of strategic
mobilization to demonstrate American resolve and a willingness
1*4-8
to compete with the U.S.S.R. on a global scale. The very
act of adopting such a program and funding naval and other
military improvements would be a visible expression of U.S.
intentions to our Allies, the Third World, and the Communist
Bloc. Implementation of such a program with long-term goals
and focused national energy will demonstrate a U.S. return
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to global and free-world leadership. The Soviet Union, as
described by one author, "is already mobilized and has been
proceeding independently of any policy pursued by the U.S.
toward the U.S.S.R. for at least twenty years: through
periods of Cold War, in hot war in Vietnam, and detente." y
The Soviets have demonstrated indifference to all these U.S.
policy changes. It is time to change this pattern and for
the United States to establish and maintain a consistent
freeworld leadership posture. We should not be waiting with
resignation for a more dramatic move, such as the Soviet
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